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Abstract
We propose a simple timed broadcasting process calculus for modelling wireless net-
work protocols. The operational semantics of our calculus is given in terms of a labelled
transition semantics which is used to derive a standard (weak) bi-simulation theory. Based
on our simulation theory, we reformulate Gorrieri and Martinelli’s timed Generalized Non-
Deducibility on Compositions (tGNDC) scheme, a well-known general framework for the
definition of timed properties of security protocols. We use tGNDC to perform a semantic
analysis of three well-known key management protocols for wireless sensor networks:
µTESLA, LEAP+ and LiSP. As a main result, we provide a number of attacks to these
protocols which, to our knowledge, have not yet appeared in the literature.
1 Introduction
Wireless sensors are small and cheap devices powered by low-energy batteries, equipped with
radio transceivers, and responding to physical stimuli, such as pressure, magnetism and mo-
tion, by emitting radio signals. Such devices are featured with resource constraints (involving
power, storage and computation) and low transmission rates. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs)
are large-scale networks of sensor nodes deployed in strategic areas to gather data. Sensor
nodes collaborate using wireless communications with an asymmetric many-to-one data trans-
fer model. Typically, they send their sensed events or data to a specific node, called sink
node or base station, which collects the requested information. WSNs are primarily designed
for monitoring environments that humans cannot easily reach (e.g., motion, target tracking, fire
detection, chemicals, temperature); they are used as embedded systems (e.g., biomedical sensor
engineering, smart homes) or mobile applications (e.g., when attached to robots, soldiers, or
vehicles).
An important issue in WSNs is network security: Sensor nodes are vulnerable to several
kinds of threats and risks. Unlike wired networks, wireless devices use radio frequency chan-
nels to broadcast their messages. An adversary can compromise a sensor node, alter the in-
tegrity of the data, eavesdrop on messages, inject fake messages, and waste network resource.
∗The second author is supported by research fellowship n. AdR1601/11, funded by Dipartimento di Informatica
Verona.
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Thus, one of the challenges in developing trustworthy WSNs is to provide high-security fea-
tures with limited resources.
Generally, in order to have a secure communication between two (or more) parties, a se-
cure association must be established by sharing a secret. This secret must be created, distributed
and updated by one (or more) entity and it is often represented by the knowledge of a crypto-
graphic key. The management of such cryptographic keys is the core of any security protocol.
Due to resource limitations, all key management protocols for WSNs, such as µTESLA [32],
LiSP [31], LEAP [43], PEBL [5] and INF [1], are based on symmetric cryptography rather than
heavy public-key schemes, such as Diffie-Hellman [7] and RSA [34].
In this paper, we adopt a process calculus approach to formalise and verify real-world
key management protocols for WSNs. A process calculus is a formal and concise language
that allows us to express system behaviour in the form of a process term. In the last years,
a number of distributed process calculi have been proposed for modelling different aspects
of wireless systems [21, 28, 35, 24, 14, 10, 25, 13]. Except for [28], none of these calculi
performs any security analysis. On the other hand, some process algebras, such as CryptoCCS
and tCryptoSPA [15] have already been used in [15, 16] to study network security protocols,
also in a wireless scenario. These calculi are extensions of Milner’s CCS [26], where node
distribution, local broadcast communication, and message loss are codified in terms of point-
to-point transmission and a (discrete) notion of time.
We propose a simple timed broadcasting process calculus, called aTCWS, for modelling
wireless network protocols. Our broadcast communications span over a limited area, called
transmission range. The time model we use is known as the fictitious clock approach (see
e.g. [17]): A global clock is supposed to be updated whenever all nodes agree on this, by
globally synchronising on a special timing action σ.1 Both transmission and internal actions
are assumed to take no time. This is a reasonable assumption whenever the duration of those
actions is negligible with respect to the chosen time unit. The operational semantics of our
calculus is given in terms of a labelled transition semantics in the SOS style of Plotkin. The
calculus enjoys standard time properties, such as: time determinism, maximal progress and
patience [17]. The labelled transition semantics is then used to derive a standard (weak) bi-
simulation theory.
Based on our simulation theory, we reformulate Gorrieri and Martinelli’s timed Gener-
alized Non-Deducibility on Compositions (tGNDC) scheme [15, 16], a well-known general
framework for the definition of timed security properties. We concentrate on two particular
timed security properties expressed as instances of tGNDC: timed integrity, which guarantees
on the freshness of authenticated packets; and timed agreement, for which agreement between
two parties must be reached within a certain deadline. A nice aspect of these two properties is
that whenever they do not hold then it is possible to build a specific attacker that invalidates
the property under examination.
We use our calculus to provide a formal specification of three well-known key management
protocols for WSNs: (i) µTESLA [32], which achieves authenticated broadcast; (ii) the Loc-
alized Encryption and Authentication Protocol, LEAP+ [43], intended for large-scale wireless
1Time synchronisation relies on the presence of some clock synchronisation protocol for sensor networks [37].
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Table 1 Syntax of aTCWS.
Networks:
M,N ::= 0 empty network∣∣∣ M1 | M2 parallel composition∣∣∣ n[P]ν node
Processes:
P,Q ::= nil termination∣∣∣ !〈u〉.P broadcast∣∣∣ ⌊?(x).P⌋Q receiver with timeout∣∣∣ ⌊ ∑i∈I τ.Pi⌋Q internal choice with timeout∣∣∣ σ.P sleep∣∣∣ [u1 = u2]P; Q matching∣∣∣ [u1 . . . un ⊢r x]P; Q deduction∣∣∣ H〈u˜〉 guarded recursion
sensor networks; (iii) the Lightweight Security Protocol, LiSP [31], that, through an efficient
mechanism of re-keying, provides a good trade-off between resource consumption and network
security.
As a main result of the paper, we formally prove that the bootstrapping phase of µTESLA
enjoys the timed integrity property, while it does not satisfy timed agreement as it is ex-
posed to a replay attack. Once bootstrapping is terminated, the core of the protocol, i.e. the
authenticated-broadcast phase, enjoys both timed integrity and timed agreement. Then, we
prove that the single-hop pairwise shared key mechanism of LEAP+ enjoys timed integrity,
while it does not respect timed agreement due to the presence of another replay attack, des-
pite the security assessment of [43]. Finally, we prove that the LiSP protocol does not satisfy
neither timed integrity nor timed agreement. Again, our proof relies on the exhibition of a
replay attack to the protocol. To our knowledge all these attacks are new and they have not yet
appeared in the literature.
We end this introduction with an outline of the paper. In Section 2, we provide syntax,
operational semantics and behavioural semantics of aTCWS. In the same section we prove that
our calculus enjoys time determinism, maximal progress and patience. In Section 3, we adapt
Gorrieri and Martinelli’s tGNDC framework to aTCWS. In Sections 4, 5 and 6 we provide a
security analysis of the three key management protocols mentioned above. The paper ends
with a section on conclusions, future and related work.
2 The Calculus
In Table 1, we provide the syntax of our applied Timed Calculus for Wireless Systems, in
short aTCWS, in a two-level structure: A lower one for processes and an upper one for networks.
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We assume a set Nds of logical node names, ranged over by letters m, n. Var is the set of
variables, ranged over by x, y, z. We define Val to be the set of values, and Msg to be the set of
messages, i.e., closed values that do not contain variables. Letters u, u1 . . . range over Val, and
v,w . . . range over Msg. We assume a class of message constructors ranged over by Fi.
Both syntax and operational semantics of aTCWS are parametric with respect to a given
decidable inference system, i.e. a set of rules to model operations on messages by using con-
structors. For instance, the rules
(pair) w1 w2pair(w1,w2) (fst)
pair(w1,w2)
w1
(snd) pair(w1,w2)
w2
allow us to deal with pairs of values. We write w1 . . . wk ⊢r w0 to denote an application of rule
r to the closed values w1 . . .wk to infer w0. Given an inference system, the deduction function
D : 2Msg → 2Msg associates a (finite) set φ of messages to the set D(φ) of messages that can be
deduced from φ, by applying instances of the rules of the inference system.
In aTCWS, networks are collections of nodes (which represent devices) running in parallel
and using a unique common channel to communicate with each other. All nodes are assumed
to have the same transmission range (this is a quite common assumption in models for sensor
networks [27]). The communication paradigm is local broadcast: only nodes located in the
range of the transmitter may receive data. We write n[P]ν for a node named n (the device
network address) executing the sequential process P. The tag ν contains (the names of) the
neighbours of n (ν ⊆ Nds). In other words, ν contains all nodes in the transmission cell of n
(except n itself), thus modelling the network topology.2 For simplicity, when ν = {m} we will
omit parentheses. Our wireless networks have a fixed topology as node mobility is not relevant
to most sensor networks. Moreover, nodes cannot be created or destroyed.
Processes are sequential and live within the nodes. We let Prc be the set of all possible
processes. We write nil to denote the skip process. The sender process !〈w〉.P allows to broad-
cast the message w, the continuation being P. The process ⌊?(x).P⌋Q denotes a receiver with
timeout. Upon successful reception, the variable x of P is instantiated with the received mes-
sage. The process
⌊∑
i∈I τ.Pi
⌋Q denotes internal choice with timeout. The process σ.P models
sleeping for the current time slot. The process [w1 = w2]P; Q is the standard “if then else”
construct: it behaves as P if w1 = w2, and as Q otherwise. The process [w1 . . .wk ⊢r x]P; Q
is the inference construct. It tries to infer a message w from the premises w1 . . .wk through
an application of rule r; if it succeeds, then it behaves as P (where w replaces x), otherwise it
behaves as Q.
In the processes !〈w〉.P, ⌊?(x).P⌋Q, ⌊∑i∈I τ.Pi⌋Q and σ.Q, the occurrences of P, Pi and Q
are said to be guarded; the occurrences of Q are also said to be time-guarded. In the processes
⌊?(x).P⌋Q and [w1 . . .wn ⊢r x]P the variable x is said to be bound in P. A variable which is
not bound is said to be free. We adopt the standard notion of α-conversion on bound variables
and we identify processes up to α-conversion. We assume there are no free variables in our
networks. The absence of free variables will be maintained as networks evolve. We write
{w/x}P for the substitution of the variable x with the message w in P.
2We could have represented the topology in terms of a restriction operator a` la CCS on node names; we have
preferred our notation to keep at hand the neighbours of a node.
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In order to deal with (guarded) recursion, we assume a set PrcIds of process identifiers
ranged over by H,H1,H2 . . ., and we write H〈w1, . . . ,wk〉 to denote a process defined via an
equation H(x1, . . . , xk) def= P, where (i) the tuple x1, . . . , xk contains all the variables that
appear free in P, and (ii) P contains only guarded occurrences of the process identifiers, such
as H itself. We say that recursion is time-guarded if P contains only time-guarded occurrences
of the process identifiers. We write Prcwt for the set of processes in which summations are
finite-indexed and recursive definitions are time-guarded.
Remark 2.1 The recursion construct allows us to define persistent listeners, i.e., receivers
which wait indefinitely for an incoming message, as Rcv def= ⌊?(x).P⌋Rcv; similarly, internal
choice (without timeout) can be defined as Sum def= ⌊∑i∈I τ.Pi⌋Sum.
We report some notational conventions. We write ∏i∈I Mi to mean the parallel composition
of all Mi, for i ∈ I. We identify
∏
i∈I Mi = 0 if I = ∅. The process [w1 = w2]P is an abbreviation
for [w1 = w2]P; nil. Similarly, we will write [w1 . . .wn ⊢r x]P to mean [w1 . . .wn ⊢r x]P; nil.
In the sequel, we will make use of a standard notion of structural congruence to abstract
over processes that differ for minor syntactic differences.
Definition 2.2 Structural congruence over networks, written ≡, is defined as the smallest equi-
valence relation, preserved by parallel composition, which is a commutative monoid with re-
spect to parallel composition and internal choice, and for which n[H〈w˜〉]ν ≡ n[{w˜/˜x}P]ν, if
H(x˜) def= P.
Here, we provide some definitions that will be useful in the remainder of the paper. Given
a network M, nds (M) returns the node names of M. More formally:
nds (0) def= ∅ ; nds (n[P]ν) def= {n} ; nds (M1 | M2) def= nds (M1) ∪ nds (M2) .
For m ∈ nds (M), the function ngh(m, M) returns the set of the neighbours of m in M. Thus, if
M ≡ m[P]ν | N then ngh(m, M) = ν. We write Env (M) to mean all the nodes of the environ-
ment reachable by the network M. Formally: Env (M) def= ∪m∈nds(M) ngh(m, M) \ nds (M).
The syntax provided in Table 1 allows us to derive networks which are somehow ill-formed.
The following definition identifies well-formed networks. Basically, it (i) rules out networks
containing two nodes with the same name; (ii) imposes symmetric neighbouring relations (we
recall that all nodes have the same transmission range); (iii) imposes network connectivity to
allow clock synchronisation.
Definition 2.3 (Well-formedness) M is said to be well-formed if
• whenever M ≡ N | m1[P1]ν1 | m2[P2]ν2 then m1 , m2
• whenever M ≡ N | m1[P1]ν1 | m2[P2]ν2 , with m1 ∈ ν2, then m2 ∈ ν1
• for all m, n ∈ nds (M) there are m1, . . . ,mk ∈ nds (M), such that m=m1, n=mk, mi ∈
ngh(mi+1, M), for 1≤i≤k−1.
We let Net be the set of well-formed networks. Henceforth, we will always work with networks
in Net.
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Table 2 LTS - Transmissions, internal actions and time passing.
(Snd)
−
m[!〈w〉.P]ν m!w⊲ν−−−−−−−−→ m[P]ν (Rcv)
m ∈ ν
n[⌊?(x).P⌋Q]ν m?w−−−−−→ n[{w/x}P]ν
(RcvEnb)
m < nds (M)
M m?w−−−−−→ M
(RcvPar) M
m?w
−−−−−→ M′ N m?w−−−−−→ N′
M | N m?w−−−−−→ M′ | N′
(Bcast) M
m!w⊲ν
−−−−−−−−→ M′ N m?w−−−−−→ N′ µ := ν\nds (N)
M | N
m!w⊲µ
−−−−−−−−→ M′ | N′
(Tau) h ∈ I
m[⌊∑i∈I τ.Pi⌋Q]ν τ−−−→ m[Ph]ν (TauPar)
M τ−−−→ M′
M | N τ−−−→ M′ | N
(σ-nil) −
n[nil]ν σ−−−→ n[nil]ν (Sleep)
−
n[σ.P]ν σ−−−→ n[P]ν
(σ-Rcv) −
n[⌊?(x).P⌋Q]ν σ−−−→ n[Q]ν (σ-Sum)
−
m[⌊∑i∈I τ.Pi⌋Q]ν σ−−−→ m[Q]ν
(σ-Par) M
σ
−−−→ M′ N σ−−−→ N′
M | N σ−−−→ M′ | N′
(σ-0) −
0 σ−−−→ 0
2.1 Labelled Transition Semantics
In Table 2 we provide a Labelled Transition System (LTS) for aTCWS in the SOS style of
Plotkin. Intuitively, the computation proceeds in lock-step: between every global synchronisa-
tion all nodes proceeds asynchronously by performing actions with no duration, which repres-
ent either broadcast or input or internal actions. Communication proceeds even if there are no
listeners: Transmission is a non-blocking action. Moreover, communication is lossy as some
receivers within the range of the transmitter might not receive the message. This may be due
to several reasons such as signal interferences or the presence of obstacles.
The metavariable λ ranges over the set of labels {τ, σ,m!w⊲ν,m?w} denoting internal ac-
tion, time passing, broadcasting and reception. Let us comment on the transition rules of
Table 2. In rule (Snd) a sender m dispatches a message w to its neighbours ν, and then contin-
ues as P. In rule (Rcv) a receiver n gets a message w coming from a neighbour node m, and
then evolves into process P, where all the occurrences of the variable x are replaced with w.
If no message is received in the current time slot, a timeout fires and the node n will continue
with process Q, according to the rule (σ-Rcv). The rule (RcvPar) models the composition of
two networks receiving the same message from the same transmitter. Rule (RcvEnb) says that
every node can synchronise with an external transmitter m. Notice that a node n[⌊?(x).P⌋Q]ν
might execute rule (RcvEnb) instead of rule (Rcv). This is because a potential receiver may
miss a message for several reasons (internal misbehaving, interferences, weak radio signal,
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Table 3 LTS - Matching, recursion and deduction
(Then) n[P]
ν λ−−−→ n[P′]ν
n[[w = w]P; Q]ν λ−−−→ n[P′]ν
(Else) n[Q]
ν λ−−−→ n[Q′]ν w1 , w2
n[[w1 = w2]P; Q]ν λ−−−→ n[Q′]ν
(Rec) n[{
w˜/x˜}P]ν λ−−−→ n[P′]ν H(x˜) def= P
n[H〈w˜〉]ν λ−−−→ n[P′]ν
(DedTrue) n[{
w/x}P]ν λ−−−→ n[P′]ν w1 . . .wn ⊢r w
n[[w1 . . .wn ⊢r x]P; Q]ν λ−−−→ n[P′]ν
(DedFalse) n[Q]
ν λ−−−→ n[Q′]ν ∄ w. w1 . . .wn ⊢r w
n[[w1 . . .wn ⊢r x]P; Q]ν λ−−−→ n[Q′]ν
etc); in this manner we model message loss. Rule (Bcast) models the propagation of messages
on the broadcast channel. Note that this rule looses track of the neighbours of m that are in
N. Thus, in the label m!w⊲ν the set ν always contains the neighbours of m which can receive
the message w. Rule (Tau) models local computations within a node due to a nondetermin-
istic internal choice. Rule (TauPar) propagates internal computations on parallel components.
The remaining rules model the passage of time. Rule (Sleep) models sleeping for one time
slot. Rules (σ-nil) and (σ-0) are straightforward. Rule (σ-Rcv) models timeout on receivers,
and similarly rule (σ-Sum) describes timeout on internal activities. Rule (σ-Par) models time
synchronisation between parallel components. Rules (Bcast) and (TauPar) have their symmetric
counterparts. Table 3 reports the straightforward rules for nodes containing matching, recursion
or deduction.
Below, we report a number of basic properties of our LTS.
Proposition 2.4 Let M, M1 and M2 be well-formed networks.
1. m < nds (M) if and only if M m?w−−−−−→ N, for some network N.
2. M1 | M2
m?w
−−−−−→ N if and only if there are N1 and N2 such that M1 m?w−−−−−→ N1, M2 m?w−−−−−→
N2 with N = N1 | N2.
3. If M m!w⊲µ−−−−−−−−→ M′ then M ≡ m[!〈w〉.P]ν | N, for some m, ν, P and N such that
m[!〈w〉.P]ν m!w⊲ν−−−−−−−−→ m[P]ν, N m?w−−−−−→ N′, M′ ≡ m[P]ν | N′ and µ = ν \ nds (N).
4. If M τ−−−→ M′ then M ≡ m[⌊∑i∈I τ.Pi⌋Q]ν | N, for some m, ν, Pi, Q and N such that
m[⌊∑i∈I τ.Pi⌋Q]ν τ−−−→ m[Ph]ν, for some h ∈ I, and M′ ≡ m[Ph]ν | N.
5. M1 | M2
σ
−−−→ N if and only if there are N1 and N2 such that M1 σ−−−→ N1, M2 σ−−−→ N2
and N = N1 | N2.
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As the topology of our networks is static and nodes cannot be created or destroyed, it is
easy to prove the following result.
Proposition 2.5 (Well-formedness preservation) Let M be a well-formed network. If M λ−−−→
M′ then M′ is a well-formed network.
Proof By induction on the derivation of the transition M λ−−−→ M′. 
2.2 Time properties
Our calculus aTCWS enjoys some desirable time properties. Here, we outline the most signific-
ant ones. Proposition 2.6 formalises the deterministic nature of time passing: a network can
reach at most one new state by executing a σ-action.
Proposition 2.6 (Time Determinism) If M is a well-formed network with M σ−−−→ M′ and
M σ−−−→ M′′, then M′ and M′′ are syntactically the same.
Proof By induction on the length of the proof of M σ−−−→ M′. 
Patience guarantees that a process will wait indefinitely until it can communicate [17]. In
our setting, this means that if no transmissions can start then it must be possible to execute a
σ-action to let time pass.
Proposition 2.7 (Patience) Let M ≡∏i∈I mi[Pi]νi be a well-formed network, such that for all
i ∈ I it holds that mi[Pi]νi . mi[!〈w〉.Qi]νi , then there is a network N such that M σ−−−→ N.
Proof By induction on the structure of M. 
The maximal progress property says that processes communicate as soon as a possibility
of communication arises [17]. In other words, the passage of time cannot block transmissions.
Proposition 2.8 (Maximal Progress) Let M be a well-formed network. If M ≡ m[!〈w〉.P]ν |
N then M σ−−−→ M′ for no network M′.
Proof By inspection on the rules that can be used to derive M σ−−−→ M′, because sender
nodes cannot perform σ-actions. 
Basically, time cannot pass unless the specification itself explicitly asks for it. This ap-
proach provides a lot of power to the specification, which can precisely handle the flowing of
time. Such an extra expressive power leads, as a drawback, to the possibility of abuses. For
instance, infinite loops of broadcast actions or internal computations prevent time passing. The
well-timedness (or finite variability) property [29] puts a limitation on the number of instantan-
eous actions that can fire between two contiguous σ-actions. Intuitively, well-timedness says
that time passing never stops: Only a finite number of instantaneous actions can fire between
two subsequent σ-actions.
Definition 2.9 (Well-Timedness) A network M satisfies well-timedness if there exists an up-
per bound k ∈ N such that whenever M λ1−−−−→ · · · λh−−−−→ where λ j is not directly derived by an
application of (RcvEnb) and λ j , σ (for 1 ≤ j ≤ h) then k ≤ h.
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The above definition takes into account only transitions denoting an active involvement of the
network, that is why we have left out those transitions which can be derived by applying rule
(RcvEnb). However, as aTCWS is basically a specification language, there is no harm in allowing
specifications which do not respect well-timedness. Of course, when using our language to
give a protocol implementation, then one must verify that the implementation satisfies well-
timedness: No real-world service (even a attackers) can stop the passage of time.
The following proposition provides a criterion to check well-timedness. We recall that
Prcwt denotes the set of processes where summations are always finite-indexed and recursive
definitions are always time-guarded.
Proposition 2.10 Let M =∏i∈I mi[Pi]νi be a network. If for all i ∈ I we have Pi ∈ Prcwt then
M satisfies well-timedness.
Proof First notice that without an application of (RcvEnb) the network M can perform only
a finite number of transitions. Then proceed by induction on the structure of M. 
2.3 Behavioural Semantics
Based on the LTS of Section 2.1, we define a standard notion of timed labelled bisimilarity for
aTCWS. In general, a bisimulation describes how two terms (in our case networks) can mimic
each other actions. Here, we focus on weak equivalences, i.e., we abstract on internal actions
of the system, thus we must distinguish between the transmissions which may be observed and
those which may not be observed by the environment. We extend the set of rules of Table 2
with the following two rules:
(Shh) M
m!w⊲∅
−−−−−−−−→ M′
M τ−−−→ M′
(Obs) M
m!w⊲ν
−−−−−−−−→ M′ ν , ∅
M !w⊲ν−−−−−−→ M′
Rule (Shh) models transmissions that cannot be observed because none of the potential receivers
is in the environment. Rule (Obs) models transmissions of messages that can be received (and
hence observed) by those nodes of the environment contained in ν. Notice that the name of
the transmitter is removed from the label. This is motivated by the fact that nodes may refuse
to reveal their identities, e.g. for security reasons or limited sensory capabilities in perceiving
these identities. Note also that in a derivation tree the rule (Obs) can only be applied at top-level.
In the remaining of the paper, the metavariable α will range over the following actions:
τ, σ, !w⊲ν and m?w. We adopt the standard notation for weak transitions: the relation ==⇒
denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of τ−−−→; the relation α===⇒ denotes ==⇒ α−−−→==⇒; the
relation αˆ===⇒ denotes ==⇒ if α = τ and α===⇒ otherwise.
Definition 2.11 (Bi-similarity) A relation R over well-formed networks is a simulation if M R
N implies that whenever M α−−−→ M′ there is N′ such that N αˆ===⇒ N′ and M′ R N′. A relation
R is called bisimulation if both R and its converse are simulations. We say that M and N are
similar, written M . N, if there is a simulation R such that M R N. We say that M and N are
bisimilar, written M ≈ N, if there is a bisimulation R such that M R N.
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The notions of similarity and bisimilarity between networks are congruences, as they are
preserved by parallel composition. We give only the statement for bisimilarity. A similar
statement holds for similarity.
Theorem 2.12 (≈ is a congruence) Let M and N be two well-formed networks such that M ≈
N. Then M | O ≈ N | O for all networks O such that M | O and N | O are well-formed.
3 A Reformulation of tGNDC for Wireless Networks
In order to achieve a formal verification of key management protocols for WSNs, we adopt a
general schema for the definition of timed security properties, called timed Generalized Non-
Deducibility on Compositions (tGNDC) [15], a real-time generalisation of Generalized Non-
Deducibility on Compositions (GNDC) [8]. The main idea is the following: a system M is
tGNDC ρ(M) if for every attacker A the composed systems M | A satisfies the specification
ρ(M), with respect to a given timed behavioural relation. The timed behavioural relation we
will use in the following analysis is the similarity relation . of Definition 2.11.
The tGNDC framework [15] was originally designed for an extension of Milner’s CCS [26],
where node distribution, local broadcast communication, and message loss are not primitives
but codified in terms of point-to-point transmission and a (discrete) notion of time. In this
section, we will reformulate tGNDC in our setting.
A distributed protocol involves a set of nodes P = {m1, . . .mk} which may be potentially
under attack, depending on the proximity to the attacker. This means that, in general, the
attacker is a network composed by a number of, possibly colluding, nodes. In order to deal
with the most general and adverse attacker we assume a set A = {a1, . . . , ak} of fresh malicious
nodes so that each node mi ∈ P of the protocol is associated to a corresponding attacking node
ai ∈ A (for i = 1, . . . , k). Every node in A is in touch both with the corresponding node in P
and with the other nodes in A.
Definition 3.1 (Attacking Nodes) We say that A = {a1, . . . , ak} ⊆ Nds is a set of attacking
nodes for P = {m1, . . . ,mk} ⊆ Nds if and only if A ∩ P = ∅. We say that A is a set of
attacking nodes for the network M if and only if A is a set of attacking nodes for nds (M) and
A∩ Env (M) = ∅.
In our setting, an attacker is parameterised both on the set of nodes P of the protocol under
attack and on some initial knowledge φ0. During the execution of the protocol an attacker
may increase its knowledge by grasping messages sent by the parties according to Dolev-Yao
constrains.
The knowledge of a network is expressed by the set of messages that the network can
manipulate. Thus, we write msg(P) to denote the set of the messages that appear in the process
P. Formally, we define msg(P) as msg∅(P), where msgS : Prc → 2Msg, for S ⊆ PrcIds, is
defined in Table 4 along the lines of [15]. Intuitively, msgS is a function that visits recursively
the sub-terms of P and the body of the recursive definitions referred by P. The index S is
used to guarantee that the unwinding of every recursive definition is performed exactly once.
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Table 4 Function msgS
msgS (nil) def= ∅
msgS (!〈u〉.P) def= get(u) ∪ msgS (P)
msgS (⌊?(x).P⌋Q) def= msgS (P) ∪ msgS (Q)
msgS (
⌊∑
i∈I τ.Pi
⌋Q) def= ⋃i∈I msgS (Pi) ∪ msgS (Q)
msgS (σ.P) def= msgS (P)
msgS ([u1 = u2]P; Q) def= get(u1) ∪ get(u2) ∪ msgS (P) ∪ msgS (Q)
msgS ([u1 . . . un ⊢r x]P; Q) def=
⋃n
i=1 get(ui) ∪ msgS (P) ∪ msgS (Q)
msgS (H〈u1 . . . ur〉) def=

⋃r
i=1 get(ui) ∪ msgS∪{H}(P) if H(x˜)
def
= P and H<S⋃r
i=1 get(ui) otherwise
where get : Val → 2Msg is defined as follows:
get(a) def= {a} (basic message)
get(x) def= ∅ (variable)
get( Fi(u1, . . . , uki ) ) def=
{
{Fi(u1, . . . , uki )} ∪ {u1 . . . uki } if Fi(u1 . . . uki ) ∈ Msg
get(u1) ∪ . . . ∪ get(uki ) otherwise.
A straightforward generalisation of msgS to networks is the following:
msg(0) def= ∅ ; msg(n[P]ν) def= msg(P) ; msg(M1 | M2) def= msg(M1) ∪ msg(M2) .
Now, everything is in place to formally define our notion of attacking networks. For sim-
plicity, in the rest of the paper, given a set of nodes N and a node n, we will write N \ n for
N \ {n}, and N ∪ n for N ∪ {n}. Moreover, we will use the symbol ⊎ to denote disjoint union.
Definition 3.2 (Attacker) Given a set of node names P = {m1, . . . ,mk}, a set A = {a1, . . . , ak}
of attacking nodes for P, and an initial knowledge φ0 ⊆ Msg, we define the set of attacking
networks as follows:
A
φ0
A/P
def
=

k∏
i=1
ai[Qi]µi : Qi ∈ Prcwt, msg(Qi) ⊆ D(φ0), µi = (A \ ai) ∪ mi
 .
Remark 3.3 By Proposition 2.10, the requirement Qi ∈ Prcwt in the definition of Aφ0A/P guar-
antees that our attackers respects well-timedness and hence cannot prevent the passage of time.
Sometimes, for verification reasons, we will be interested in observing part of the protocol
M under examination. We will assume that the environment contains a fresh node obs <
nds (M)∪Env (M)∪A, that we call the ‘observer’, unknown to the attacker. For convenience,
the observer cannot transmit: it can only receive messages.
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Definition 3.4 Given a network M =∏ki=1 mi[Pi]νi , picked a set A = {a1, . . . , ak} of attacking
nodes for M and fixed a set O ⊆ nds (M) of nodes to be observed, we define:
MA
O
def
=
k∏
i=1
mi[Pi]ν′i where ν′i
def
=
{ (νi ∩ nds (M)) ∪ ai ∪ obs if mi ∈ O
(νi ∩ nds (M)) ∪ ai otherwise.
This definition expresses that (i) every node mi of the protocols has a dedicated attacker located
at ai, (ii) network and attacker are considered in isolation, without any external interference,
(iii) only obs can observe the behaviour of nodes in O, (iv) node obs does not interfere with the
protocol as it cannot transmit, (v) the behaviour of the nodes in nds (M) \ O is not observable.
To ease the notation, whenever O = nds (M) we will write MA instead of MAnds(M) .
We can now formalise the tGNDC family properties as follows.
Definition 3.5 (tGNDC) Given a network M, an initial knowledge φ0, a set O ⊆ nds (M) of
nodes under observation and a network ρ(M), representing the specification property for M,
we write M ∈ tGNDC ρ(M)
φ0,O
if and only if for all sets A of attacking nodes for M it hods that
MA
O
∣∣∣ A . ρ(M) for every A ∈ Aφ0
A/nds(M) .
It should be noticed that when showing that a system M is tGNDC ρ(M)
φ0,O
, the universal quanti-
fication on attackers required by the definition makes the proof quite involved. Thus, we look
for a sufficient condition for tGNDC which does not make use of the universal quantification.
For this purpose, we rely on a timed notion of term stability [15]. Intuitively, a network M is
said to be time-dependent stable if the attacker cannot increase its knowledge in a indefinite
way when M runs in the space of a time slot. Thus, we can predict how the knowledge of the
attacker evolves at each time slot. First, we need a formalisation of computation.
Definition 3.6 (Execution trace) An execution trace is a sequence of labelled transitions.
If Λ is the sequence of actions α1α2 . . . αn, we write M Λ===⇒ M′ to mean M ==⇒ α1−−−−→==⇒
· · · ==⇒
αn
−−−−→==⇒ M′.
In order to count how many time slots embraces an execution trace Λ, we define #σ(Λ) to be
the number of occurrences of σ-actions in Λ.
Definition 3.7 (Time-dependent stability) A network M is said to be time-dependent stable
with respect to a sequence of knowledge {φ j} j≥0 if whenever
MA
∣∣∣ A Λ===⇒ M′ ∣∣∣ A′
where A is a set of attacking nodes for M, A ∈ Aφ0
A/nds(M), #
σ(Λ) = j and nds (M′) = nds (M),
then msg(A′) ⊆ D(φ j).
In other words, if M is time-dependent stable with respect to {φ j} j≥0 then, whenever MA |
A Λ===⇒ M′ | A′, with #σ(Λ)= j and nds (M′)=nds (M), then A′ ∈ Aφ j
A/nds(M′). Thus, φ j ex-
presses the knowledge of the attacker at the end of the j-th time slot.
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Time-dependent stability is the crucial notion that allows us to replace the universal quan-
tification on the possible attackers with the most general attacker. Intuitively, given a sequence
of knowledge {φ j} j≥0 and a set P = {m1, . . . ,mk} of nodes we pick a set A = {a1, . . . , ak}
of attacking nodes for P and we define the top attacker Topφ0
A/P
as the network whose initial
knowledge is φ0 and which is able to manage the whole knowledge provided by φ j after j time
slots.
Definition 3.8 (Top Process) Given a sequence of knowledge {φ j} j≥0 the set of top processes
{Tφ j} j≥0 is defined as follows:
Tφ j
def
=
⌊ ∑
w∈D(φ j)
τ.!〈w〉.Tφ j
⌋
Tφ j+1 .
The top attacker is defined by replicating the top process in every attacking node.
Definition 3.9 (Top Attacker) Given P = {m1, . . . ,mk} and A = {a1, . . . , ak} set of attacking
nodes for P and fixed a sequence of knowledge {φ j} j≥0, the top attacker is defined as:
Topφ j
A/P
def
=
k∏
i=1
ai[Tφ j]mi .
Basically, the network Topφ j
A/P
can perform the following transitions:
• Topφ j
A/P
ai!w⊲mi
=========⇒ Topφ j
A/P
, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and w ∈ D(φ j)
• Topφ j
A/P
σ
−−−→ Topφ j+1
A/P
.
In particular, after j time slots (i.e. j σ-actions) Topφ j
A/P
can replay any message in D(φ j) to
the network under attack. Moreover, every attacking node ai can send messages to the corres-
ponding node mi, but, unlike the attackers of Definition 3.2, it does not need to communicate
with the other nodes in A as it already owns the full knowledge of the system at time j.
Remark 3.10 Notice that the top attacker does not satisfy well-timedness (see Definition 2.9),
as the process identifiers involved in the recursive definition are not time-guarded. However,
this is not a problem as we are looking for a sufficient condition which ensures tGNDC with
respect to well-timed attackers.
A first compositional property that involves the top attacker is the following.
Lemma 3.11 Let M1 | M2 be time-dependent stable with respect to a sequence of knowledge
{φ j} j≥0. Let A1 and A2 be disjoint sets of attacking nodes for M1 and M2, respectively. Let
O1 ⊆ nds (M1) and O2 ⊆ nds (M2). Then
(M1 | M2)A1⊎A2O1⊎O2
∣∣∣ Topφ0
A1⊎A2/nds(M) . M1
A1
O1
∣∣∣ M2A2O2
∣∣∣ Topφ0
A1/nds(M1)
∣∣∣ Topφ0
A2/nds(M2) .
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The following theorem says that Topφ0
A/P
is the reference attacker for checking tGNDC.
Theorem 3.12 (Criterion for tGNDC) If M is time-dependent stable with respect to a se-
quence of knowledge {φ j} j≥0, A is a set of attacking nodes for M and O ⊆ nds (M), then
MA
O
∣∣∣ Topφ0
A/nds(M) . N implies M ∈ tGNDC
N
φ0,O
.
The notion of the most powerful attacker is eventually employed to obtain the composi-
tional property outlined by the following proposition.
Theorem 3.13 (Composing tGNDC) Let M = M1 | . . . | Mk be time-dependent stable with
respect to a sequence of knowledge {φ j} j≥0. Let A1, . . . ,Ak be disjoint sets of attacking nodes
for M1, . . . , Mk, respectively. Let Oi ⊆ nds (Mi), for 1≤i≤k. Then,
(Mi)AiOi
∣∣∣ Topφ0
Ai/nds(Mi) . Ni, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, implies M ∈ tGNDC
N1 |...|Nk
φ0,O1⊎...⊎Ok
.
Proof By Theorem 2.12 we have
(M1)A1O1
∣∣∣ . . . ∣∣∣ (Mk)AkOk
∣∣∣ Topφ0
A1/nds(M1)
∣∣∣ . . . ∣∣∣ Topφ0
Ak/nds(Mk) . N1
∣∣∣ . . . ∣∣∣ Nk .
By applying Lemma 3.11 and Theorem 2.12 we obtain
(M1 | . . . | Mk)A1⊎...⊎AkO1⊎...⊎Ok
∣∣∣ Topφ0
A1⊎...⊎Ak/nds(M1 |...|Mk) . N1
∣∣∣ . . . ∣∣∣ Nk .
Thus, by an application of Theorem 3.12 we can derive M ∈ tGNDC N1 |...|Nk
φ0,O1⊎...⊎Ok
. 
3.1 Two timed security properties
We formalise two useful timed properties for security protocols as instances of tGNDC ρ
φ0,O
, by
suitably defining the abstraction function ρ [15]. We will focus on the two following timed
properties:
• A timed notion of integrity, called timed integrity, which guarantees that only fresh pack-
ets are authenticated.
• A timed notion of authentication, called timed agreement, according to which agreement
must be reached within a certain deadline, otherwise authentications does not hold.
More precisely, fixed a delay δ, a protocol is said to enjoy the timed integrity property if,
whenever a packet pi is authenticated during the i-th time interval, then this packet was sent at
most i − δ time intervals before. For verification reasons, when expressing time integrity in the
tGNDC scheme, we will introduce in the protocol under examination a special message authi
which is emitted only when the packet pi is authenticated.
A protocol is said to enjoy the timed agreement property if, whenever a responder n has
completed a run of the protocol, apparently with an initiator m, then m has initiated the protocol,
apparently with n, at most δ time intervals before, and the two agents agreed on some set of
data. When expressing time agreement in the tGNDC scheme, we introduce in the protocol
under examination a special message helloi, which is emitted by the initiator at the i-th run of
the protocol, and a special message endi, emitted by the responder, representing the completion
of the protocol launched at run i.
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4 A Security Analysis of µTESLA
The µTESLA protocol was designed by Perrig et al. [33] to provide authenticated broadcast
from a base station (BS) towards all nodes of a wireless network. The protocol is based on a
delayed disclosure of symmetric keys, and it requires the network to be loosely time synchron-
ised. The protocol computes a MAC for every packet to be broadcast, by using different keys.
The transmission time is split into time intervals of ∆int time units each, and each key is tied
to one of them. The keys belongs to a key chain k0, k1, . . . , kn generated by BS by means of a
public one-way function F. In order to generate this chain, BS randomly chooses the last key kn
and repeatedly applies F to compute all the other keys, whereby ki := F(ki+i), for 0 ≤ i ≤ n−1.
The key-chain mechanism together with the one-way function F, provides two major advant-
ages: (i) a key ki can be used to generate the beginning of the chain k0, . . . , ki−1, by simply
applying F as many time as necessary, but it cannot be used to generate any of the subsequent
keys; (ii) any of the keys k0, . . . , ki−1 can be used to authenticate ki. Moreover, each node m j is
pre-loaded with a master key kbs:m j for unicast communications with bs.
In this section, we analyse the two main phases of the protocol: bootstrapping new receiv-
ers and authenticated broadcast. The former establishes the node’s initial setting in order to
start receiving the authenticated packets, the latter describes the transmission of authenticated
information.
4.1 Bootstrapping new receivers
When a new node m wish to join the network, it sends a request message to the base station bs
containing its name and a nonce n j, where j counts the number of bootstrapping requests:
m → bs : n j | m .3
The base station replies with a message of initialisation of the following form:
bs→ m : ∆int | i | kl | l | mac
(kbs:m, (n j | ∆int | i | kl | l))
where ∆int is the duration of every time interval, i is the current time interval of bs, kl is a key
in the key chain, and l, with l < i, represents the time interval in which kl was employed for
packet encryption; hence, kl can be used for authenticating the subsequent keys in the chain.
The secret key kbs:m is used to authenticate unicast messages; the nonce n j allows the node m
to verify the freshness of the reply coming from bs.
Encoding in aTCWS Our encoding contains a few simplifications with respect to the original
protocol. As described in Section 4.2, the authenticated-broadcast phase consists of two distinct
events: packet broadcast and key disclosure. For the sake of simplicity, in our encoding these
events will happen in contiguous time slots, hence the time interval ∆int corresponds to two
σ-actions. Moreover, we assume that ∆int is already known by all nodes. Hence, bs needs to
3Here, the “|” symbol denotes message concatenation.
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communicate just the current time interval i and the time interval l of the committing key kl.
We fix l = i − 1. Thus, we can simplify the reply message as follows:
bs→ m : i | ki−1 | mac
(kbs:m, (n j | i | ki−1)) .
When giving our specifications in aTCWS we will require some new deduction rules to model
Message Authentication Code and a pseudo-random function:
(mac) w1 w2
mac(w1,w2) (prf)
w1 w2
prf(w1,w2) .
The application mac(k, p) returns a unique number which represents the MAC of packet p,
obtained from the payload of that packet and a key k. This will be used to authenticate the
packet p. The application prf(m,wi) returns a pseudo-random value wi+1 associated to a node
m and the last generated value wi.
Table 5 provides both the code running at each requesting node m and the code running
at the base station bs. The base station runs the process Di, where i represents the index of
the current key as well as the current time interval. The requesting nodes run the process A j,
where j counts the number of bootstrapping requests made by the node. At each request j, the
receiver generates a nonce n j. Upon authentication of a key k, the node starts the authenticated-
broadcast phase, via the process R〈i + 1, i−1,⊥, k〉 defined in Table 7 of Section 4.2.
At the beginning of the bootstrapping phase the network appears as:
µTESLAboot
def
= bs[D1]νbs | m1[A1]νm1 | . . . | mk[A1]νmk
where m ∈ νbs and bs ∈ νm, for every m ∈ {m1, . . . ,mk}.
4.1.1 Timed Agreement
The timed agreement property for the bootstrapping phase of µTESLA requires that the base
station bs successfully replies to a request packet p j, sent by the initiator node m, in at most
∆int time units (corresponding in our encoding to two σ-actions).
Here, we prove that the bootstrapping phase does not satisfies timed agreement. In partic-
ular, we show that an attacker may prevent the bootstrapping request from reaching the base
station, thus the bootstrapping phase may not terminate in due time. In order to do that, we
present a replay attack which can be described, without loss of generality, by focusing on a
part of the protocol, called µTESLA′boot, consisting of a single requesting node m and the base
station bs. Moreover, we slightly modify the processes running at bs to signal the end of the
bootstrapping phase. Thus, we define the process D′i as a slight modification of Di (defined in
Table 5) where process E4i is replaced by
E4i
′ def
= σ.[end n ⊢pair t]!〈t〉.Di+1 .
With this modification, the encoding of the fragment under investigation of the bootstrapping
phase of µTESLA becomes:
µTESLA′boot
def
= bs[D′1]νbs | m[A1]νm .
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Table 5 µTESLA: bootstrapping phase.
Request at node m
A j
def
= [m n j−1 ⊢pr f n j] Build a random nonce n j
[m n j ⊢pair t] Build a pair t with name m and nonce n j
[req t ⊢pair p j] Build request packet using the pair t
!〈p j〉.σ.B j broadcast the request and move to B j
B j
def
= ⌊?(w).C j⌋A j+1 Receive the bootstrapping packet
C j
def
= [w ⊢ f st q]C1j ;σ.A j+1 extract the first component
C1j
def
= [w ⊢snd h] extract the MAC
[n j q ⊢pair r] add the nonce n j
[kbs:m r ⊢mac h′] calculate MAC h′ on r
[h = h′]C2j ;σ.A j+1 match the two MACs
C2j
def
= [q ⊢ f st i]C3j ;σ.A j+1 extract the current interval i
C3j
def
= [q ⊢snd k]σ.R〈i + 1, i−1,⊥, k〉 extract key k and start authenticated broadcast
Reply at base station bs
Di
def
= ⌊?(p).Ei⌋σ.Di+1 Wait for incoming request packets
Ei
def
= [p ⊢ f st p1]E1i ;σ.σ.Di+1 extract the first component
E1i
def
= [p1 = req]E2i ;σ.σ.Di+1 check if p is a request packet
E2i
def
= [p ⊢snd t] extract the second component
[t ⊢ f st m]E3i ;σ.σ.Di+1 extract the sender name m
E3i
def
= [t ⊢snd n] extract the nonce n
[i ki−1 ⊢pair qi] pair up key ki−1 with the current time interval i
[n qi ⊢pair ri] add the nonce n
[kbs:m ri ⊢mac hi] calculate MAC hi on ri with m’s master key kbs:m
[qi hi ⊢pair wi]σ.!〈wi〉.E4i build packet wi with qi and MAC hi
E4i
def
= σ.Di+1 broadcast wi and go to the next requesting state
where the request packet p j = pair(req, pair(m, n j)) reports the beginning of the bootstrapping
phase, while the message end j = pair(end, n j) signals the end of the phase.
We define the timed agreement property as the following abstraction of the protocol:
ρagr(µTESLA′boot)
def
= bs[ ˆD1]obs | m1[ ˆA1]obs
where
ˆDi
def
= ⌊τ.σ.!〈wi〉.σ.!〈endi〉. ˆDi+1⌋σ. ˆDi+1
ˆAi
def
= !〈pi〉.σ.⌊τ.σ.R〈i + 1, i−1,⊥, ki−1〉⌋ ˆAi+1
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with wi = pair(qi,mac(km:s, pair(ni, qi)) and qi = pair(i, ki−1), as defined in Table 5. Basically,
these processes are obtained by D′i and Ai by abstracting on receptions. The node obs is the
observing node introduced in Section 3.
The abstraction ρagr(µTESLA′boot) correctly expresses the timed agreement property for
the system µTESLA′boot. In fact, the following proposition says that bs successfully replies to a
request packet pi, sent by the initiator node m, in exactly ∆int time units (i.e. in two σ-actions).
Proposition 4.1 Whenever ρagr(µTESLA′boot)
Λ
===⇒
!pi⊲obs
−−−−−−−−→
Ω
===⇒
!endi⊲obs
−−−−−−−−−−→ then #σ(Ω) = 2.
Now, in order to show that µTESLA′boot satisfies timed agreement, we should prove that
µTESLA′boot ∈ tGNDC
ρagr(µTESLA′boot)
φ0,O
where O = {m, bs} and φ0 ⊆ Msg. More precisely, given an appropriate set of attacking nodes
A = {a, b}, we should prove that
(
µTESLA′boot
)A
O
∣∣∣ A . ρagr(µTESLA′boot) for every A ∈ Aφ0A/nds(µTESLA′boot) .
This would imply that all execution traces of the system (µTESLA′boot)AO | A can be matched
by ρagr(µTESLA′boot). Unfortunately, this is not the case. The following theorem shows how
an attacker A can force the system (µTESLA′boot)AO | A to execute a trace in which the special
message end j is broadcast 2∆int time units (that is, four σ-actions) later than p j. This trace
cannot be executed by ρagr(µTESLA′boot), as stated in Proposition 4.1.
Theorem 4.2 (Replay Attack to µTESLA Bootstrapping Phase) µTESLA′boot does not sat-
isfy the timed agreement property.
Proof We propose an attacker that delays agreement. Let us define the set of attacking nodes
A = {a, b} for nds
(
µTESLA′boot
)
. Let us fix the initial knowledge φ0 = ∅, so to deal with the
most general situation. We set νa = {m, b} and νb = {bs, a}, and we assume that all nodes
in nds
(
µTESLA′boot
)
are observable, thus νm = {bs, a, obs} and νbs = {m, b, obs}. We give an
intuition of the replay attack in Table 6. Basically, the attacker delays the reception at bs of
packet p1 so that bs can complete the protocol only after 2∆int time units. This denotes a replay
attack that breaks agreement.
Formally, we define the attacker A ∈ Aφ0
A/{m,bs}
as follows:
A = a[X]νa
∣∣∣ b[Y]νb
where X def= ⌊?(x).σ.!〈x〉.nil⌋nil and Y def= σ.⌊?(y).σ.!〈y〉.nil⌋nil. We then consider the system
(µTESLA′boot)A
∣∣∣ A
which admits the following execution trace:
!p1⊲obs . σ . τ . σ . τ . !p2⊲obs . σ . !w1⊲obs . σ . !end1⊲obs
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Table 6 Replay attack to µTESLA bootstrapping phase.
m → bs : p1 m starts the protocol, but p1 is grasped by a and missed by bs
σ
−−−→ the systems moves to the next time slot
a → b : p1 a sends p1 to b
σ
−−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
b → bs : p1 b replays p1 to bs
m → bs : p2 m sends a new request p2 which gets lost
σ
−−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
bs → m : w1 bs replies to p1 with w1 (which is discarded by m)
σ
−−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
bs → ∗ : end1 bs signals the end of the protocol
containing four σ-actions between the packets p1 and end1 (we report the corresponding com-
putation in the Appendix). However, by Proposition 6.1 this trace cannot be matched by
ρagr(µTESLA′boot). As a consequence,
(µTESLA′boot)A
∣∣∣ A 6. ρagr(µTESLA′boot)
and hence the timed agreement property does not hold. 
4.1.2 Timed Integrity
In this section, we show that the bootstrapping phase of µTESLA satisfies the timed integrity
property. In particular, we prove that nodes authenticate only keys that are associated to a
nonce sent by the same node wrapped in a request packet in the previous time interval ∆int.
Again, without loss of generality, we focus on a part of the protocol, called µTESLA′′boot,
consisting of the base station bs and a single node m. We signal authentication at the node side
by broadcasting a special message. This is done by replacing the process A j of Table 5 with
the process A′′j which is the same as A j except for C
3
j which is replaced by:
C3j
′′ def
= [q ⊢snd k]σ.[auth n ⊢pair t]!〈t〉.R〈i + 1, i−1,⊥, k〉 .
Thus, the fragment of the protocol under examination becomes:
µTESLA′′boot
def
= bs[D1]νbs | m[A′′1 ]νm .
The abstraction of the protocol that expresses timed integrity can be formalised as follows:
ρint(µTESLA′′boot)
def
= bs[Tick]∅ | m[ ¯A1]obs
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where Tick def= σ.Tick and ¯Ai
def
= !〈pi〉.σ.⌊τ.σ.!〈authi〉.R〈i + 1, i−1,⊥, ki−1〉⌋ ¯Ai+1, with authi =
pair(auth, ni) and pi = pair(req, pair(m, ni)). Again, the node obs is the observer introduced in
Section 3.
In the abstraction ρint(µTESLA′′boot), it is straightforward to see that the action authi, which
authenticates a key with nonce ni, occurs exactly ∆int time units (that is, two σ-actions) after
the request pi, which carries the nonce ni. This fact is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3 Whenever ρint(µTESLA′′boot)
Λ
===⇒
!pi⊲obs
−−−−−−−−→
Ω
===⇒
!authi⊲obs
−−−−−−−−−−−→ M then #σ(Ω)=2.
The previous result says that ρint(µTESLA′′boot) expresses correctly the timed integrity property.
Thus, in order to show that the encoding of the bootstrapping phase of µTESLA satisfies the
timed integrity property, we will prove that
µTESLA′′boot ∈ tGNDC
ρint(µTESLA′′boot)
φ0,{m}
for some appropriate φ0. Notice that node m signals both the begin and the end of the authen-
tication protocol. Thus, we need to observe only the packets sent by m. Moreover, according
to Definition 3.7, µTESLA′′boot is time-dependent stable with respect to the following sequence
of knowledge:
φ0
def
= {p1}
φ1
def
= φ0 ∪ {w1}
φ2
def
= φ1 ∪ {auth1, p2}
...
φi
def
= φi−1 ∪ {auth j, p j+1} if j > 0 and i = 2 j
φi
def
= φi−1 ∪ {w j+1} if j > 0 and i = 2 j + 1
(1)
where wi = pair(qi,mac(km:bs, pair(ni, qi)) and qi = pair(i, ki−1), as defined in Table 5. Intuit-
ively, φi consists of φi−1 together with the set of messages an intruder can get by eavesdropping
on a run of the protocol during the time slot i.
Lemma 4.4 Given two attacking nodes a and b, for m and bs respectively, and fixed the se-
quence of knowledge {φi}i≥0 as in (1), then
1. bs[D1]b
∣∣∣ Topφ0b/bs . bs[Tick]∅
2. m[A′′1 ]{a,obs}
∣∣∣ Topφ0
a/m
. m[ ¯A1]obs.
Theorem 4.5 (µTESLAboot Timed Integrity) The protocol µTESLA′′boot satisfies the timed in-
tegrity property:
µTESLA′′boot ∈ tGNDC
ρint(µTESLA′′boot)
φ0,{m}
.
Proof By an application of Lemma 4.4 and Theorem 3.13. 
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4.2 Authenticating broadcast packets
In the authenticated-broadcast phase, at each time interval i, one or more packets pi are de-
ployed by the sender, each one containing the payload and the MAC calculated with the key
ki bound to the i-th time interval. Thus, at time interval i the bs broadcasts the authenticated
message:
bs→ ∗ : pi | mac(pi, ki) .
In the same time interval i, the key tied to the previous time interval i − 1 is disclosed to all
receivers, so that they can authenticate all the previously received packets:
bs→ ∗ : ki−1 .
Loose time synchronisation on the key disclosure time prevents malicious nodes to forge pack-
ets with modified payloads. Nodes discard packets containing MACs calculated with already
disclosed keys, as those packets could come from an attacker. In this phase the nodes exploit
the two main advantages of the key chain and the one-way function F: (i) the last received
key ki can be authenticated by means of F and the last authenticated key kl; (ii) lost keys can
be recovered by applying F to the last received key ki. For instance, suppose that BS has sent
packet p1 (containing a MAC with key k1) in the first time interval, packet p2 in the second
time interval and packet p3 in the third one. If the key k1 is correctly received by a node m
while keys k2 and k3 get lost, then m can only authenticate the packet p1 but not p2 or p3.
However, if m gets the key k4 then m can authenticate k4 by using k1, and it can also recover
the lost keys k2 and k3 to authenticate p2 and p3, respectively.
In Table 7 we provide an encoding of the authenticated-broadcast phase of µTESLA. Also
in this case our encoding contains a few simplifications with respect to the original protocol. As
said for the bootstrapping phase, we assume that the duration of the time interval ∆int is fixed
and it is already known by the nodes. In our encoding this time interval corresponds to two
σ-actions. We assume that in each time interval i the sender broadcasts alternately only one
packet pi and the key ki−1 of the previous time interval. Thus, we assume a sequence q1, q2, . . .
of payloads to be authenticated by using the corresponding keys k1, k2, . . . Moreover, we do not
model the recovery of lost keys, hence the payload qi can only be authenticated by receiving
the key ki. This simplification yields a easier to read model which can be generalised to fulfil
the original requirements of the protocol.
The encoding essentially defines two kind of processes: the senders S i, and the receivers
R(i, l, r, kl), where i is the current time interval, r is the last received packet, l is the time interval
when the last key kl was authenticated. Since we bind one packet to one key, i also refers to the
index number of packets.
The authenticated-broadcast phase of µTESLA can be represented as follows:
µTESLAauth
def
= bs[S 1]νbs
∣∣∣ m1[R〈1,−1,⊥, kbs〉]νm1 ∣∣∣ . . . ∣∣∣ mh[R〈1,−1,⊥, kbs〉]νmh
where m ∈ νbs and bs ∈ νm, for every m ∈ {m1, . . . ,mh}. We use ⊥ because at the beginning
there is no packet to authenticate. We write kbs to denote the key transmitted by the base station
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Table 7 µTESLA: authenticated-broadcast phase.
Sender:
S i
def
= [qi ki ⊢mac ui] build MAC with payload and key
[ui qi ⊢pair pi] build packet with mac and payload
!〈pi〉.σ. broadcast packet, synchronise
!〈ki−1〉.σ. broadcast previous key, synchronise
S i+1 and go to next sending state
Receiver:
R(i, l, r, kl) def= ⌊?(p).σ.P〈i, l, p, r, kl〉⌋ receive a pkt, synchronise, go to P
Q〈i, l, r, kl〉 if timeout go to Q
P(i, l, p, r, kl) def= ⌊?(k).T 〈i, l, p, r, kl, k〉⌋ receive a key k and move to T
R〈i+1, l, p, kl〉 if timeout go to next receiving state
T (i, l, p, r, kl, k) def= [Fi−1−l(k) = kl] authenticate key k with F and kl
[r ⊢fst u] extract MAC from previous pkt r
[r ⊢snd q] extract payload from r
[q k ⊢mac u′] build MAC for r with key k
[u = u′] check MACs to authenticate r
σ.Z〈i+1, i−1, p, r, k〉;
σ.R〈i+1, i−1, p, k〉;
σ.R〈i+1, i−1, p, k〉;
σ.R〈i+1, l, p, kl〉
Z(i, l, p, r, kl) def= R〈i, l, p, kl〉 authenticated-broadcast succeeded
Q(i, l, r, kl) def= ⌊?(k).T 〈i, l, r, r, kl, k〉⌋ receive a key, synchronise, and
R〈i+1, l, r, kl〉 go to next receiving state
bs and authenticated at the node’s site during the bootstrapping phase. Notice that, according
to Table 5, kbs is associated to the time interval −1.
4.2.1 Timed Integrity
In this section, we show that the authenticated-broadcast phase of µTESLA enjoys timed integ-
rity. In particular, we prove that receivers authenticate only packets that have been sent 2∆int
time units before (that is, four σ-actions before) in the correct order, even in the presence of
the intruder. The crucial point is that even if the intruder acquires the shared keys then it is “too
late” to break integrity, i.e., to authenticate packets which are more than 2∆int time units old.
As done for µTESLAboot, we signal authentication of a packet r by broadcasting a special
packet pair(auth, r). Thus, we replace the process R(i, l, r, kl) of Table 7 with R′(i, l, r, kl), where
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the process Z(i, l, p, r, kl) is replaced by
Z′(i, l, p, r, kl) def= [auth r ⊢pair t]!〈t〉.R′〈i, l, p, kl〉 .
The formalisation of the authenticated-broadcast phase for µTESLA becomes the following:
µTESLA′auth
def
= bs[S 1]νbs
∣∣∣ m1[R′〈1,−1,⊥, kbs〉]νm1 ∣∣∣ . . . ∣∣∣ mh[R′〈1,−1,⊥, kbs〉]νmh .
We define the timed integrity property as the following abstraction of the protocol µTESLA′
auth:
ρint(µTESLA′auth)
def
= bs[S 1]obs
∣∣∣ m1[ ˆR1]obs ∣∣∣ . . . ∣∣∣ mh[ ˆR1]obs
where S 1 is the process defined in Table 7, while ˆRi
def
= σ.⌊τ.σ.!〈authi−1〉. ˆRi+1⌋ ˆRi+1. The node
obs is the observing node introduced in Section 3. Here, we abstract on receivers’ behaviour:
At time interval i+2 they may signal the authentication of the packet pi = pair(mac(ki, qi), qi)
by sending the special packet authi = pair(auth, pi).
The abstraction ρint(µTESLA′auth) is a faithful representation of the timed integrity property
for the authenticated-broadcast phase of µTESLA.
Proposition 4.6 Whenever ρint(µTESLA′auth)
Λ
===⇒
!pi⊲obs
−−−−−−−−→
Ω
===⇒
!authi⊲obs
−−−−−−−−−−−→ M then #σ(Ω)=4.
In order to show that µTESLA′
auth satisfies timed integrity, we will prove that
µTESLA′auth ∈ tGNDC
ρint(µTESLA′auth)
φ0,{bs,m1,...,mk}
for some appropriate φ0. Notice that µTESLA′auth is time-dependent stable with respect to the
following sequence of knowledge:
φ0
def
= {p1}
φ1
def
= φ0 ∪ {k0}
φ2
def
= φ1 ∪ {p2, auth0}
...
φi
def
= φi−1 ∪ {p j+1, auth j−1} if j > 0 and i = 2 j
φi
def
= φi−1 ∪ {k j} if j > 0 and i = 2 j + 1.
(2)
Now, we choose an attacking node a j for each m j, with 1 ≤ j ≤ h, and an attacking node b
for bs. By applying the compositional criterion of Theorem 3.13, it suffices to prove a simpler
integrity result for each node in isolation composed with its corresponding top attacker.
Lemma 4.7 Given an attacking node b for bs and the attacking nodes a j for m j, with 1 ≤ j ≤
h, and fixed the sequence of knowledge {φi}i≥0 as in (2), then the encoding in Table 7 satisfies
the following:
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1. bs[S 1]{b,obs}
∣∣∣ Topφ0b/bs . bs[S 1]obs
2. m j[R′〈1,−1,⊥, ¯k〉]{a j,obs}
∣∣∣ Topφ0
a j/m j
. m j[ ˆR1]obs, for 1 ≤ j ≤ h.
Theorem 4.8 (µTESLAauth Timed Integrity) The protocol µTESLA′auth satisfies timed integ-
rity:
µTESLA′auth ∈ tGNDC
ρint(µTESLA′auth)
φ0,{bs,m1,...,mk}
.
Proof By applying Lemma 4.7 and Theorem 3.13. 
4.2.2 Timed Agreement
The timed agreement property for the authenticated-broadcast phase µTESLAauth requires that
when the receiver m j completes the protocol, apparently with the initiator bs, then bs has ini-
tiated the protocol, apparently with m j, at most two time intervals ∆int before, and the two
parties agree on the sent data. In other words, the packet pi is authenticated by m j exactly 2∆int
time units after it has been sent by bs. This says that any formulation of timed agreement for
µTESLAauth would actually coincide with timed integrity. Thus, Proposition 4.6 demonstrates
that ρint(µTESLA′auth) is also a faithful abstraction of timed agreement. As a consequence,
Theorem 4.8 also says that µTESLAauth satisfies timed agreement.
5 A Security Analysis of LEAP+
The LEAP+ protocol [43] provides a keying mechanisms to establish authenticated commu-
nications. The protocol is designed to establish four types of keys: an individual key, shared
between a base station and a node, a single-hop pair-wise key, shared between two sensor
nodes, a cluster key, shared between a node and all its neighbourhood, a group key, shared
between a base station and all sensor nodes of the network.
In this section, we focus on the single-hop pairwise key mechanism as it is underlying to
all other keying methods. This mechanism is aimed at establishing a pair-wise key between
a sensor node and a neighbours in ∆leap time units. In order to do that, LEAP+ exploits two
peculiarities of sensor nodes: (i) the set of neighbours of a node is relatively static, and (ii) a
sensor node that is being added to the network will discover most of its neighbours at the time
of its initial deployment.
The single-hop pairwise shared key mechanism of LEAP+ consists of three phases.
Key pre-distribution. A network controller fixes an initial key kin and a computational efficient
pseudo-random function prf(). Both kin and prf() are pre-loaded in each node, before
deployment. Then, each node r derives its master key: kr:= prf(kin, r).
Neighbour discovery. As soon as a node m is scattered in the network area it tries to discover
its neighbours by broadcasting a hello packet that contains its identity, m, and a freshly
created nonce ni, where i counts the number of attempts:
m → ∗ : m | ni .
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Then each neighbour r replies with an ack message which includes its identity r, the
corresponding MAC calculated by using r’s master key kr, to guarantee authenticity, and
the nonce ni, to guarantee freshness. Specifically:
r → m : r | mac(kr, (r | ni)) .
Pairwise Key Establishment. When m receives the packet q from r, it tries to authenticate it
by using the last created nonce ni and r’s master key kr = prf(kin, r). Notice that m
can calculate kr as kin and prf have been pre-loaded in m, and r is contained in q. If
the authentication succeeds, then both nodes proceed in calculating the pairwise key
km:r := prf(kr,m). Any other message between m and r will be authenticated by using
the pairwise key km:r. If m does not get an authenticated packet from the responder in
due time, it sends a new hello packet with a fresh nonce.
In Table 8, we provide an encoding of the single-hop pairwise shared key mechanism of
LEAP+. For the sake of clarity, we assume that ∆leap consists of two time slots, i.e. it takes two
σ-actions. To yield an easier to read model, we consider only two nodes and we define
LEAP+ def= m[S 1]νm
∣∣∣ r[R]νr
where m is the initiator, r is the responder, with m ∈ νr and r ∈ νm. Moreover, we assume that
r has already computed its master key kr := prf(kin, r). This simple model does not loose in
generality with respect to the multiple nodes case.
5.1 Timed Agreement
The timed agreement property for LEAP+ requires that the responder r successfully completes
the protocol initiated by m, with the broadcasting of a hello packet, in at most ∆leap time units
(i.e. two σ-actions). We will show that LEAP+ does not satisfy the timed agreement property.
For our analysis, in order to make observable the completion of the protocol, we define
LEAP′+ by replacing in LEAP+ the process R of Table 8 with the process R′ defined as the
same as R except for process R6 which is replaced by
R6′ def= σ.[end n ⊢pair e]!〈e〉.nil .
We use the following abbreviations: helloi
def
= pair(hello, pair(m, ni)) and endi def= pair(end, ni).
The timed agreement property of LEAP+ is defined by the following abstraction:
ρagr(LEAP′+) def= m[ ¯S 1]obs | r[ ¯R1]obs
where ¯S i
def
= !〈helloi〉.σ⌊τ.σ.nil⌋ ¯S i+1 and ¯Ri
def
= ⌊τ.σ!〈qi〉.σ.!〈endi〉.nil⌋σ. ¯Ri+1, with qi =
pair(r,mac(kr , pair(r, ni))), as defined in Table 8.
The following statement says that the abstraction ρagr(LEAP′+) expresses correctly the
timed agreement property for LEAP+.
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Table 8 LEAP+ specification
Sender at node m:
S i
def
= [ni−1 m ⊢pr f ni] build a random nonce ni
[m ni ⊢pair t] build a pair t with m and the nonce ni
[hello t ⊢pair p] build hello packet using the pair t
!〈p〉.σ.P broadcast hello, synchronise and move to P
P def= ⌊?(q).P1⌋S i+1 wait for response from neighbours
P1 def= [q ⊢ f st r]P2;σ.S i+1 extract node name r from packet q,
P2 def= [q ⊢snd h] extract MAC h from packet q
[r ni ⊢pair t′] build a pair t′ with r and current nonce ni
[kin r ⊢pr f kr] calculate r’s master key kr
[kr t′ ⊢mac h′] calculate MAC h′ with kr and t′
[h′ = h]P3;σ.S i+1 if it matches with the received one go to P3,
otherwise go to next time unit and restart
P3 def= [kr m ⊢pr f km:r]P4 calculate the pairwise key km:r
P4 def= σ.nil synchronise and conclude key establishment
Receiver at node r:
R def= ⌊?(p).R1⌋σ.R Wait for incoming hello packets
R1 def= [p ⊢ f st p1]R2;σ.σ.R extract the first component
R2 def= [p ⊢snd p2] extract the second component
[p1 = hello]R3;σ.σ.R check if p is a hello packet
R3 def= [p2 ⊢ f st m]R4;σ.σ.R extract the sender name m
R4 def= [p2 ⊢snd n] extract the nonce n
[r n ⊢pair t] build a pair t with n and r
[kr t ⊢mac h] calculate MAC h on t with r’s master key kr
[r h ⊢pair q] build packet q with node name r and MAC h
σ.!〈q〉.R5 synchronise, broadcast q and go to R5
R5 def= [kr m ⊢pr f km:r]R6 calculate pairwise key km:r
R6 def= σ.nil synchronise and conclude key establishment
Proposition 5.1 Whenever ρagr(LEAP′+) Λ===⇒ !helloi⊲obs−−−−−−−−−−−→ Ω===⇒ !endi⊲obs−−−−−−−−−−→ then #σ(Ω) = 2.
Now, in order to prove timed agreement for LEAP+ we should show that
LEAP′+ ∈ tGNDC ρagr(LEAP
′+)
φ0,{m,r}
for some appropriate φ0. This would imply that all traces of the system composed by LEAP′+
in parallel with an attacker can be mimicked by ρagr(LEAP′+).
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Table 9 Replay attack to LEAP+.
m → ∗ : hello1 m starts the protocol, but hello1 is grasped by a and missed by r
σ
−−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
a → b : hello1 a sends hello1 to b
σ
−−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
b → r : hello1 b replays hello1 to r
m → ∗ : hello2 m broadcasts hello2 (containing a fresh nonce n2), which gets lost
σ
−−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
r → m : q1 r replies by sending q1 (which is discarded by m)
σ
−−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
r → ∗ : end1 r signals the end of the protocol
However, this is not the case, as stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2 (Replay Attack to LEAP+) LEAP′+ does not satisfy the timed agreement prop-
erty.
Proof We define an attacker that delays agreement. Let us define the set of attacking nodes
A = {a, b} for nds (LEAP′+). Let us fix the initial knowledge φ0 = ∅, so to deal with the
most general situation. We set νa = {m, b} and νb = {r, a}, and we assume all the nodes in
nds (LEAP′+) are observable, thus νm = {r, a, obs} and νr = {m, b, obs}. We give an intuition of
the replay attack in Table 9. Basically, the attacker delays the reception of the packet p1 at m
which cannot complete the protocol within two time slots, but only after four time slots, thus
breaking agreement. Formally we define the attacker A ∈ Aφ0
A/{m,r}
as follows:
A = a[X]νa | b[Y]νb
where the processes X and Y are the same as those defined in the proof Theorem 4.2. Now, we
consider the system
(LEAP′+)A
∣∣∣ A = m[S 1]νm ∣∣∣ r[R′]νr ∣∣∣ A
and we find that it admits the following execution trace
!hello1⊲obs . σ . τ . σ . τ.!hello2⊲obs . σ . !q1⊲obs . σ . !end1⊲obs
where the packet hello1 and the corresponding packet end1 are divided by four σ-actions (we
report the corresponding computation in the Appendix). Proposition 5.1 says that this trace can-
not be mimicked by the specification ρagr(µTESLA′boot). As a consequence, the timed agree-
ment property for LEAP+ does not hold. 
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5.2 Timed Integrity
The timed integrity property for LEAP+ says that hello messages and authentication messages
with the same nonce must differ for at most ∆leap time units. We show that LEAP+ satisfies
the timed integrity property. For doing that, we slightly modify the specification of LEAP+ to
make observable key authentication. We define
LEAP′′+ def= m[S ′′1 ]νm
∣∣∣ r[R]νr
where the process S ′′i is the same as process S i of Table 8, except for process P4 which is
replaced by
P4′′ def= σ.[auth t ⊢pair a]!〈a〉.nil .
For simplicity, we use the following abbreviation: authi = pair(auth, pair(m, ni)).
In order to formally represent the timed integrity property, we define the following abstrac-
tion of the protocol:
ρint(LEAP′′+) def= m[ ˆS 1]obs
∣∣∣ r[Tick]∅
where ˆS i
def
= !〈helloi〉.σ.
⌊
τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil
⌋
ˆS i+1 and Tick
def
= σ.Tick .
By construction, ρint(LEAP′′+) is a faithful representation of timed integrity for LEAP+ (we
recall that in our encoding ∆leap corresponds to two σ-actions).
Proposition 5.3 For every i ≥ 1, whenever ρint(LEAP′′+) Λ===⇒ !helloi⊲obs−−−−−−−−−−−→ Ω===⇒ !authi⊲obs−−−−−−−−−−−→,
then #σ(Ω) = 2.
Now, we notice that LEAP′′+ is time-dependent stable with respect to the sequence of
knowledge {φi}i≥0, defined as follows:
φ0
def
= {hello1}
φ1
def
= φ0 ∪ {mac(kr , pair(r, n1))}
φ2
def
= φ1 ∪ {hello2, auth1}
...
φi
def
= φi−1 ∪ {hello j+1, auth j} if j > 0 and i = 2 j
φi
def
= φi−1 ∪ {mac(kr , pair(r, n j+1))} if j > 0 and i = 2 j + 1 .
(3)
Now, we pick two attacking nodes a and b, for m and r, respectively, and we focus on the ob-
servation of node m as it signals both the beginning and the end of the authentication protocol.
Again, by applying Theorem 3.13 it suffices to prove a simpler result for each node in isolation
composed with its corresponding top attacker.
Lemma 5.4 Given two attacking nodes a and b, for m and r respectively, and fixed the se-
quence of knowledge {φi}i≥0 as in (3), then
1. m[S ′′1 ]{a,obs}
∣∣∣ Topφ0
a/m
. m[ ˆS 1]obs
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2. r[R]{b}
∣∣∣ Topφ0b/r . r[Tick]∅ .
Theorem 5.5 (LEAP+ Timed integrity) LEAP′′+ satisfies the timed integrity property:
LEAP′′+ ∈ tGNDC ρint(LEAP
′′+)
φ0,{m}
.
Proof By applying Lemma 5.4 and Theorem 3.13. 
6 A Security Analysis of LiSP
In order to achieve a good trade-off between resource limitations and network security, Park et
al. [31] have proposed a Lightweight Security Protocol (LiSP) for WSNs. LiSP provides (i) an
efficient key renewal mechanism which avoids key retransmission, (ii) authentication for each
key-disclosure, and (iii) the possibility of both recovering and detecting lost keys.
A LiSP network consists of a Key Server (ks) and a set of sensor nodes m1, . . . ,mk. The
protocol assumes a one way function F, pre-loaded in every node of the system, and employs
two different key families: (i) a set of temporal keys k0, . . . , kn, computed by ks by means of F,
and used by all nodes to encrypt/decrypt data packets; (ii) a set of master keys kks:m j , one for
each node m j, for unicast communications between m j and bs. As in µTESLA, the transmission
time is split into time intervals, each of them is ∆refresh time units long. Thus, each temporal
key is tied to a time interval and renewed every ∆refresh time units. At a time interval i, the
temporal key ki is shared by all sensor nodes and it is used for data encryption. Key renewal
relies on loose node time synchronisation among nodes. Each node stores a subset of temporal
keys in a buffer of a fixed size, say s with s << n. When a time interval elapses, each node
removes the active key from the buffer to free a slot for the next key taken from the sequence
k0, . . . , kn.
The LiSP protocol consists of the following phases.
Initial Setup. At the beginning, ks randomly chooses a key kn and computes a sequence of
temporal keys k0, . . . , kn, by using the function F, as in µTESLA: ki := F(ki+1). Then,
ks waits for reconfiguration requests from nodes. More precisely, when ks receives a
reconfiguration request from a node m j, at time interval i, it unicasts the packet InitKey:
ks→ m j : enc(kks:m j , (s | ks+i | ∆refresh)) | hash(s | ks+i | ∆refresh)
where s represents the buffer size, ks+i is the initial key and ∆refresh is the duration of the
refresh interval. The operator enc(k, p) represents the encryption of p by using the key
of k, while hash(p) generates a message digest for p by means of a cryptographic hash
function used to check the integrity of the packet p.
When m j receives the InitKey packet, it computes the sequence of keys
ks+i−1, ks+i−2, . . . , ki
by applying the function F to ks+i. Then, it activates ki for data encryption and it stores
the remaining keys in its local buffer; finally it sets up a ReKeyingTimer to expires after
∆refresh/2 time units (this value applies only for the first rekeying).
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Re-Keying. At each time interval i, with i ≤ n, ks employs the active encryption key ki to
encode the key ks+i. The resulting packet is broadcast as an UpdateKey packet:
ks→ ∗ : enc(ki, ks+i) .
When a node receives an UpdateKey packet, it tries to authenticate the key received in
the packet; if the node succeeds in the authentication then it recovers all keys that have
been possibly lost and updates its key buffer. When the time interval i elapses, every node
discards ki, activates the key ki+1 for data encryption, and sets up the ReKeyingTimer to
expire after ∆refresh time units for future key switching (after the first time, switching
happens every ∆refresh time units).
Authentication and Recovery of Lost Keys. The one-way function F is used to authenticate and
recover lost keys. If s is the size of the key buffer and l, with l ≤ s, is the number of
stored keys in the buffer, then s − l represents the number of keys which have been lost
by the node. When a sensor node receives an UpdateKey packet carrying a new key k, it
calculates F s−l(k) by applying s − l times the function F. If the result matches with the
last received temporal key, then the node stores k in its buffer and recovers all lost keys.
Reconfiguration. When a node m j joins the network or misses more than s temporal keys, then
its buffer is empty. Thus, it sends a RequestKey packet in order to request the current
configuration:
m j → ks : RequestKey | m j .
Upon reception, node ks performs authentication of m j and, if successful, it sends the
current configuration via an InitKey packet.
Encoding in aTCWS In Table 10, we provide a specification of the entire LiSP protocol in
aTCWS. We introduce some slight simplifications with respect to the original protocol. We
assume that (i) the temporal keys k0, . . . , kn have already been computed by ks, (ii) both the
buffer size s and the refresh interval ∆refresh are known by each node. Thus, the broadcasting of
the InitKey packet can be simplified as follows:
ks→ m j : enc(kks:m j , ks+i) | hash(ks+i) .
Moreover, we assume that every σ-action models the passage of ∆refresh/2 time units. There-
fore, every two σ-actions the key server broadcasts the new temporal key encrypted with the
key tied to that specific interval. Finally, we do not model data encryption. Our specification
can be easily generalised to fulfil the original requirements of the protocol.
When giving our encoding in aTCWSwe will require some new deduction rules to model an
hash functions and encryption/decryption of messages:
(hash) whash(w) (enc)
w1 w2
enc(w1,w2) (dec)
w1 w2
dec(w1,w2) .
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Table 10 LiSP Specification
Key Server:
D0
def
= σ.D1 synchronise and move to D1
Di
def
= [ki ks+i ⊢enc ti] for i ≥ 1, encrypt ks+i with ki
[UpdateKey ti ⊢pair ui] build the UpdateKey packet ui
!〈ui〉.σ.σ.Di+1 broadcast ri, and move to Di+1
Li
def
= ⌊?(r).Ii+1⌋σ.Li+1 wait for request packets
Ii
def
= [r ⊢ f st r1]I1i ;σ.σ.Li+1 extract first component
I1i
def
= [r1 = RequestKey]I2i ;σ.σ.Li+1 check if r1 is a RequestKey
I2i
def
= [r ⊢snd m] extract node name
[kks:m ks+i ⊢enc wi] encrypt ks+i with kks:m
[ks+i ⊢hash hi] calculate hash code for ks+i
[wi hi ⊢pair ri] build a pair ri,
[InitKey ri ⊢pair qi] build a InitKey packet qi,
σ.!〈qi〉.σ.Li+1 broadcast qi, move to Li+1
Receiver at node m:
Z def= [RequestKey m ⊢pair r] send a RequestKey packet
!〈r〉.σ.⌊?(q).T ⌋Z wait for a reconfig. packet
T def= [q ⊢ f st q′]T 1;σ.Z extract fst component of q
T 1 def= [q′ = InitKey]T 2;σ.Z check if q is a InitKey packet
T 2 def= [q ⊢snd q′′] extract snd component of q
[q′′ ⊢ f st w] extract fst component of q′′
[q′′ ⊢snd h] extract snd component of q′′
[kks:m w ⊢dec k]T 3;σ.Z extract the key
T 3 def= [k ⊢hash h′][h = h′]T 4;σ.Z verify hash codes
T 4 def= σ.σ.R〈F s−1(k), k, s−1〉 synchronise and move to R
R(kc, kl, l) def= ⌊?(u).E⌋F wait for incoming packets
E def= [u ⊢ f st u′]E1;σ.F extract fst component of u
E1 def= [u′ = UpdateKey]E2;σ.F check UpdateKey packet
E2 def= [u ⊢snd u′′] extract snd component of u
[kc u′′ ⊢dec k]E3;σ.F decrypt u′′ by using kc
E3 def= [F s−l(k) = kl]E4;σ.F authenticate k
E4 def= σ.σ.R〈F s−1(k), k, s−1〉 synchronise and move to R
F def= [l = 0]Z;σ.R〈Fl−1(kl), kl, l−1〉 check if buffer key is empty
31
The protocol executed by the key server is expressed by the following two threads: a key
distributor Di and a listener Li waiting for reconfiguration requests from the sensor nodes, with
i being the current time interval. Every ∆refresh time units (that is, every two σ-actions) the
process Di broadcasts the new temporal key ks+i encrypted with the key ki of the current time
interval i. The listener process Li replies to reconfiguration requests coming from sensor nodes
by sending an initialisation packet.
At the beginning of the protocol, a sensor node runs the process Z, which broadcasts a
request packet to KS, waits for a reconfiguration packet q, and then checks authenticity by
verifying the hash code. If the verification is successful then the node starts the broadcasting
new keys phase. This phase is formalised by the process R(kc, kl, l), where kc represents the
current temporal key, kl is the last authenticated temporal key, and the integer l counts the
number of keys that are actually stored in the buffer. This process waits for a new UpdateKey
packet u, which is sent by the key server and carries the new temporal key in the key chain.
If u is correctly received, the process E decrypts the packet, by using the current key kc, and
authenticates the received key by applying the function F. If the key authentication is success-
ful, then the sensor node synchronises and moves to the next receiving process by updating its
state: kc is discarded and replaced by the first key in the buffer, kl is replaced by the key just
authenticated, and l := s−1, as the function F allows the recovery of lost keys. In case of either
packet loss or authentication/decryption failure, the process checks if the buffer still contains
keys. If so, the process switches the keys and moves into the next receiving state with a new
current key and l := l− 1. Otherwise, if the buffer is empty, the node needs a reconfiguration as
authentication and recovery are not longer possible. Therefore, the process moves into Z, and
restarts the initial setup phase.
To simplify the exposition of our security analysis, we formalise the key server as a pair of
nodes: a key disposer kd, which executes the process Di, and a listener kl, which executes the
process Li. Thus, the LiSP protocol, in its initial configuration, can be represented as:
LiSP def=
∏
j∈J
mi[Z]νmi | ks[D0]νks | kl[L0]νkl
where ∪ j∈J{m j} is the set of sensor nodes, and for every j ∈ J node m j ∈ νkd ∩ νkl and
{kd, kl} ⊆ νm j .
6.1 Timed Integrity
The timed integrity property for LiSP says that a node m must authenticate only keys sent by
the key server in the previous ∆refresh time units (that is, every two σ-actions). Otherwise, a
node needing a reconfiguration would authenticate an obsolete temporal key and it would not
be synchronised with the rest of the network. In this section, we show that LiSP does not satisfy
the timed integrity property because a time span of more than ∆refresh time units may elapses
between the transmission of a message by the key server and the authentication of that message
by the node.
For our analysis, without loss of generality, it suffices to focus on a part of the protocol
composed by the kl node of the key server and a single sensor node m. Moreover, in order
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to make observable a successful reconfiguration, we replace the process Z of Table 10 with a
process Z′ which is defined as the same as Z except for process T 4 which is replaced by
T 4′ def= σ.[auth k ⊢pair a]!〈a〉.σ.R〈F s−1(k), k, s−1〉 .
Thus, the part of the protocol under examination is defined as follows:
LiSP′ def= m[Z′]νm | kl[L0]νkl .
The timed integrity property can be expressed by the following abstraction of the protocol:
ρint(LiSP′) def= m[ ˆZ0]obs | kl[ ˆL0]obs
where
• ˆZi
def
= !〈r〉.σ.
⌊
τ.σ.!〈authi〉.σ.R(ki+1, ks+i, s − 1)⌋ ˆZi+1, with r = pair(RequestKey, m) and
authi = pair(auth, ks+i) as defined in Table 10;
• ˆLi
def
=
⌊
τ.σ.!〈qi〉.σ. ˆLi+1
⌋
σ. ˆLi+1, and qi is defined as in Table 10: qi = pair(InitKey ri) with
ri = pair(enc(kks:m j , ks+i), hash(ks+i)).
The next result says that ρint(LiSP′) is a faithful representation of the timed integrity property
of LiSP′.
Proposition 6.1 Whenever ρint(LiSP′) Λ===⇒
!qi⊲obs
−−−−−−−−→
Ω
===⇒
!authi⊲obs
−−−−−−−−−−−→ then #σ(Ω) = 2.
In order to show that LiSP′ satisfies timed integrity, we should prove that
LiSP′ ∈ tGNDC ρint(LiSP
′)
φ0,obs
for some appropriate φ0.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. The following theorem describes an attacker which
obliges LiSP′ to perform a trace in which authi occurs 2∆refresh time units (that is, four σ-
actions) after qi. Proposition 6.1 says that such a trace cannot be mimicked by ρint(LiSP′).
Theorem 6.2 (Replay Attack to LiSP) LiSP′ does not satisfy the timed integrity property.
Proof We propose an attacker that delays authentication. Let us define the set of attacking
nodes A = {a, b} for nds (LiSP′). Let us fix the initial knowledge φ0 = ∅ so to deal with the
most general situation. We set νa = {m, b} and νb = {kl, a}, and we assume that all nodes in
nds (LiSP′) are observable, thus νm = {kl, a, obs} and νkl = {m, b, obs}. We give an intuition of
the replay attack in Table 11. Basically, the attacker prevents the node m to receive the InitKey
packet within ∆refresh time units. Thus m completes the protocol only after 2∆refresh time units,
and it authenticates an old key. This denotes a replay attack that breaks integrity. Formally, we
define the attacker A ∈ Aφ0
A/{m,kl}
as follows:
A = a[X]νa
∣∣∣ b[Y]νb
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Table 11 Replay attack to LiSP.
m −→ kl : r m sends a RequestKey and kl correctly receives the packet
σ
−−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
kl −→ m : q1 kl replies with an InitKey which is lost by m and grasped by b
σ
−−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
b → a : q1 b sends q1 to a
m → kl : r m sends a new RequestKey which gets lost
σ
−−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
a → m : q1 a replays q1 to m
σ
−−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
m → ∗ : auth1 m authenticates q1 and signals the end of the protocol
where X def= σ.σ.⌊?(x).σ.!〈x〉.nil⌋nil and Y def= σ.⌊?(y).σ.!〈y〉.nil⌋nil. We then consider the
system (LiSP′)A | A which admits the following execution trace:
!r⊲obs . σ . !q1⊲obs . σ . τ . !r⊲obs . σ . τ . σ . !auth1⊲obs
where the packet q1 and the corresponding auth1 packet are divided by three σ-actions (we
report the corresponding computation in the Appendix). By Proposition 6.1, this trace cannot
be matched by ρint(LiSP′). As a consequence, (LiSP′)A | A 6. ρint(LiSP′). Hence the timed
integrity property does not hold. 
6.2 Timed Agreement
The timed agreement property for LiSP requires that when a sensor node m completes the
protocol, apparently with the initiator kl, then kl has initiated the protocol ∆refresh time units
before and the two nodes agree on the transmitted data. In other words: the packet qi must
be received and authenticated by m exactly ∆refresh time units after it has been sent by bs. This
suggests that, as seen for µTESLA in Section 4.2, any formulation of timed agreement for LiSP
would actually coincide with timed integrity. As a consequence, Theorem 6.2 also says that
LiSP does not satisfies timed agreement.
7 Conclusions, Related and Future Work
We have proposed a times broadcasting calculus, called aTCWS, to formalise and verify real-
world key management protocols for WSNs. Our calculus comes with a well-defined opera-
tional semantics and a (bi)simulation-based behavioural semantics. We have provided formal
specifications in aTCWS of three well-known key management protocols for WSNs: LiSP [31],
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µTESLA [32] and LEAP+ [43]. Our specifications meet the requirements of Proposition 2.10,
thus they all satisfy well-timedness. We have revised Gorrieri and Martinelli’s tGNDC [15]
framework in such a way that it can be applied to WSNs. In particular, we have expressed two
timed security properties as instances of tGNDC: timed integrity and timed agreement.
We have formally proved that the bootstrapping phase of µTESLA and the single-hop
pairwise shared key mechanism of LEAP+ enjoy timed integrity, and that the authenticated-
broadcast phase of µTESLA enjoys both timed integrity and timed agreement. On the other
hand, we have provided three different replay attacks showing that the bootstrapping phase of
µTESLA and the single-hop pairwise shared key mechanism of LEAP+ do not enjoy timed
agreement, and LiSP does not satisfy neither timed integrity nor timed agreement. The two
attacks for µTESLA and LEAP+ are somehow similar as they both delay the reception of the
initial packets of the protocols. The attack on LiSP delays the reception of an intermediate
packet which is required for the completion of the protocol.
The present work is the continuation and generalisation of [4], where a slight variant of the
calculus was introduced, and an early security analysis for the authenticated-broadcast phase of
µTESLA and the single-hop pairwise shared key mechanism of LEAP+ was performed. In [38]
the calculus aTCWS has been used by the last author to analyse the LiSP protocol. The design
of our calculus is strongly inspired by tCryptoSPA [15], a timed “cryptographic” variant of
Milner’s CCS [26].
The tGNDC schema for tCryptoSPA, has already been used by Gorrieri et al. [16] to study
several security protocols, for both wired and wireless networks. In particular, they studied
the authenticated-broadcast phase of µTESLA, proving timed integrity. The formalisation for
µTESLA we have proposed here is much less involved than the one of [16] thanks to the
specific features of our calculus for broadcast communications.
Several process calculi for wireless systems have been recently proposed. Mezzetti and
Sangiorgi [21] have introduced a calculus to describe interferences in wireless systems. Nanz
and Hankin [28] have proposed a calculus for mobile ad hoc networks for specification and
security analysis of communication protocols. They provide a decision procedure to check se-
curity against fixed intruders known in advance. Merro [24] has proposed a behavioural theory
for mobile ad hoc networks. Godskesen [14] has proposed a calculus for mobile ad hoc net-
works with a formalisation of an attack on the cryptographic routing protocol ARAN. Singh
et al. [35] have proposed the ω-calculus for modelling the AODV routing protocol. Ghassemi
et al. [11, 12] have proposed a process algebra, provided with model checking and equational
reasoning, which models topology changes implicitly in the semantics. Merro and Sibilio [25]
have proposed a timed calculus for wireless systems focusing on the notion of communica-
tion collision. Godskesen and Nanz [13] have proposed a simple timed calculus for wireless
systems to express a wide range of mobility models. Gallina and Rossi [9] have proposed a
calculus for the analysis of energy-aware communications in mobile ad hoc networks. Song
and Godskesen [36] have proposed the first probabilistic un-timed calculus for mobile wireless
systems in which connection probabilities may change due to node mobility. Kouzapas and
Philippou [20] have proposed a process calculus for dynamic networks which contains features
for broadcasting at multiple transmission ranges and for viewing networks at different levels of
abstraction.
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Recently, Arnaud et al. [3] have proposed a calculus for modelling and reasoning about
security protocols, including secure routing protocols, for a bounded number of sessions. They
provide two NPTIME decision procedures for analysing routing protocols for any network
topology, and apply their framework to analyse the protocol SRP [30] applied to DSR [18].
The AVISPA model checker [2] has been used in [40] for an analysis of TinySec [19],
LEAP [42], and TinyPK [41], three wireless sensor network security protocols, and in [39]
for an analysis of the Sensor Network Encryption Protocol SNEP [32]. In particular, in [40]
the authors considered the communication between immediate neighbour nodes which use the
pairwise shared key already established by LEAP. In this case AVISPA found a man-in-the-
middle attack where the intruder may play at the same time the role of two nodes in order to
obtain real information from one of them, thus loosing confidentiality.
It is our intention to apply our framework to study the correctness of a wide range of
wireless network security protocols, as for instance, MiniSec [23], and evolutions of LEAP+,
such as R-LEAP+ [6] and LEAP++ [22].
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A Proofs
Proofof Proposition 2.4 We single out each item of the proposition.
Item 1. The forward direction is an instance of rule (RcvEnb), the converse is proved by a
straightforward rule induction.
Item 2. The forward direction follows by noticing that only rules (RcvEnb) and (RcvPar) are
suitable for deriving the action m?w from M1 | M2; in the case of rule (RcvEnb) we just apply
rule (RcvEnb) both on M1 and on M2, in the case of rule (RcvPar) the premises require both M1
and M2 to perform an action m?w and to move to N1 and N2 with N = N1 | N2. The converse
is an instance of rule (σ-Par).
Item 3. The result is a consequence of the combination of rules (Snd) and (Bcast) and it is proved
by a straightforward rule induction.
Item 4. Again, the proof is done by a straightforward rule induction.
Item 5. The forward direction follows by noticing that the only rule for deriving the action σ
from M1 | M2 is (σ-Par) which, in the premises, requires both M1 and M2 to perform an action
σ. The converse is an instance of rule (σ-Par). 
39
Proposition A.1 If M ≈ N then nds (M) = nds (N).
Proof By contradiction. Assume there exists a node m such that m ∈ nds (M) and m <
nds (N). Then, by rule (RcvEnb), N m?w−−−−−→ N. Since M ≈ N there must be M′ such that
M m?w=====⇒ M′ with M′ ≈ N′. However, since m ∈ nds (M), by inspection on the transition
rules, there is no way to deduce a weak transition of the form M m?w=====⇒ M′. 
Proofof Theorem 2.12 We prove that the relation
R =
{ (
M | O, N | O) s.t. M ≈ N and M | O, N | O are well-formed }
is a bisimulation. We proceed by case analysis on why M | O α−−−→ Z. The interesting cases are
when the transition is due to an interaction between M and O. The remaining cases are more
elementary.
Let M | O !w⊲ν−−−−−−→ M′ | O′ (ν , ∅) by an application of rule (Obs), because M | O m!w⊲ν−−−−−−−−→
M′ | O′, by an application of rule (Bcast). There are two possible ways to derive this transition,
depending on where the sender node is located in the network.
1. M
m!w⊲µ
−−−−−−−−→ M′ and O m?w−−−−−→ O′, with m ∈ nds (M) and ν = µ \ nds (O). By an
application of rule (Obs) we obtain that M !w⊲µ−−−−−−→ M′. Since M ≈ N, it follows that there
is N′ such that N !w⊲µ======⇒ N′ with M′ ≈ N′. This implies that there exists h ∈ nds (N)
such that N h!w⊲µ=======⇒ N′. Moreover:
(a) h < nds (O), as N | O is well-formed and it cannot contain two nodes with the same
name;
(b) µ ⊆ ngh(h,N), by Proposition 2.4(3);
(c) If k ∈ µ ∩ nds (O) then h ∈ ngh(k,O), as the neighbouring relation is symmetric.
Now, in case O m?w−−−−−→ O′ exclusively by rule (RcvEnb) then also O h?w−−−−−→ O′ by
rule (RcvEnb) and item (a). In case the derivation of O m?w−−−−−→ O′ involves some ap-
plications of the rule (Rcv) then the concerned nodes have the form k[⌊?(x).P⌋Q]η with
k ∈ µ, hence h ∈ ngh(k,O) by item (c), and so we can derive O h?w−−−−−→ O′ by applying
the rules (RcvEnb) and (RcvPar).
Thus we have O h?w−−−−−→ O′ in any case. Then by an application of rule (Bcast) and several
applications of rule (TauPar) we have N | O h!w⊲ν=======⇒ N′ | O′. As ν , ∅, by an application
of rule (Obs) and several applications of rule (TauPar) it follows that N | O !w⊲ν======⇒ N′ | O′.
Since M′ ≈ N′, we obtain (M′ | O′, N′ | O′) ∈ R.
2. M m?w−−−−−→ M′ and O
m!w⊲µ
−−−−−−−−→ O′, with m ∈ nds (O) and ν = µ \ nds (M). Since M ≈ N,
it follows that there is N′ such that N m?w=====⇒ N′ with M′ ≈ N′. By an application of rule
(Bcast) and several applications of rule (TauPar) we have N | O m!w⊲ν
′
========⇒ N′ | O′, with
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ν′ = µ \ nds (N). Since M ≈ N, by Proposition A.1 it follows that ν′ = ν , ∅. Thus,
by an application of rule (Obs) it follows that N | O !w⊲ν======⇒ N′ | O′. Since M′ ≈ N′, we
obtain (M′ | O′, N′ | O′) ∈ R.
Let M | O τ−−−→ M′ | O′ by an application of rule (Shh) because M | O m!w⊲∅−−−−−−−−→ M′ | O′.
This case is similar to the previous one.
Let M | O m?w−−−−−→ M′ | O′ by an application of rule (RcvPar) because M m?w−−−−−→ M′
and O m?w−−−−−→ O′. Since M ≈ N, it follows that there is N′ such that N m?w=====⇒ N′ with
M′ ≈ N′. By an application of rule (RcvPar) and several applications of rule (TauPar) we have
N | O m?w=====⇒ N′ | O′. Since M′ ≈ N′, we obtain (M′ | O′, N′ | O′) ∈ R.
Let M | O σ−−−→ M′ | O′ by an application of rule (σ-Par) because M σ−−−→ M′ and O σ−−−→ O′.
This case is similar to the previous one. 
Proofof Lemma 3.11 We first note that a straightforward consequence of Definition 3.9 is:
Topφ0(A1⊎A2)/nds(M) = Top
φ0
A1/nds(M1) | Top
φ0
A2/nds(M2) .
Then, in order to prove the result, we just need to show that
(
M1 | M2
)A1⊎A2
O1⊎O2
∣∣∣ Topφ0
A1⊎A2/nds(M) .
(
M1
)A1
O1
∣∣∣ (M2)A2O2
∣∣∣ Topφ0
A1⊎A2/nds(M) .
To improve readability, we consider the most general case, that is O1 = nds (M1) and O2 =
nds (M2). Moreover, we assume M1 = m1[P1]ν1 , M2 = m2[P2]ν2 and therefore A1 = {a1},
A2 = {a2}. The generalisation is straightforward. Then we have:
•
(
M1 | M2
)A1⊎A2 = m1[P1]ν′1 | m2[P2]ν′2
with {a1, obs} ⊆ ν′1 ⊆ {a1,m2, obs} and {a2, obs} ⊆ ν
′
2 ⊆ {a2,m1, obs};
• MA11 = m1[P1]ν
′′
1 with ν′′1 = {a1, obs};
• MA22 = m2[P2]ν
′′
2 with ν′′2 = {a2, obs}.
We define P = {m1,m2} and A = {a1, a2}. We need to prove
m1[P1]ν
′
1 | m2[P2]ν
′
2 | Topφ0
A/P
. m1[P1]ν
′′
1 | m2[P2]ν
′′
2 | Topφ0
A/P
.
We prove that the following binary relation is a simulation:
R
def
=
⋃
j≥0
{ (
m1[Q1]ν′1 | m2[Q2]ν′2 | N , m1[Q1]ν′′1 | m2[Q2]ν′′2 | Topφ jA/P
)
such that m1[P1]ν′1 | m2[P2]ν′2 | Topφ0A/P
Λ
===⇒ m1[Q1]ν′1 | m2[Q2]ν′2 | N
for some Λ with #σ(Λ) = j } .
We consider ( m1[Q1]ν′1 | m2[Q2]ν′2 | N , m1[Q1]ν′′1 | m2[Q2]ν′′2 | Topφ jA/P ) ∈ R and we proceed
by case analysis on why m1[Q1]ν′1 | m2[Q2]ν′2 | N α−−−→ m1[ ˆQ1]ν′1 | m2[ ˆQ2]ν′2 | ˆN .
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α = m?w . This case is straightforward. In fact, the environment of the system contains exclus-
ively the node obs which cannot transmit; thus the rule (Rcv) cannot be applied. We can
consider just the rules (RcvEnb) and (RcvPar), which do not modify the network.
α = σ. Then mi[Qi]ν′i σ−−−→ mi[ ˆQi]ν′i (for i = 1, 2) and N σ−−−→ ˆN. Now also Topφ jA/P
σ
−−−→
Topφ j+1
A/P
, hence m1[Q1]ν′′1 | m2[Q2]ν′′2 | Topφ jA/P
σ
−−−→ m1[ ˆQ1]ν′′1 | m2[ ˆQ2]ν′′2 | Topφ j+1A/P.
α = !w⊲ν. We observe: (i) the environment of the system contains just the node obs and (ii)
Env (N) = {m1,m2}. Thus there exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that the transition has been derived
just by rule (Obs) from the following premise
m1[Q1]ν′1 | m2[Q2]ν′2 | N mi!w⊲obs−−−−−−−−−−→ m1[ ˆQ1]ν′1 | m2[ ˆQ2]ν′2 | ˆN .
Without loss of generality we assume i = 1, then we have m1[Q1]ν′1
m1!w⊲ν′1
−−−−−−−−−→ m1[ ˆQ1]ν′1 ,
m2[Q2]ν′2 m1?w−−−−−−→ m2[ ˆQ2]ν′2 and N m1?w−−−−−−→ ˆN. Now, to prove the similarity, we need
to simulate the m1?w-action at the node m2[Q2]ν′′2 which cannot actually receive pack-
ets from m1 < ν′′2 . We first observe that the message w can be eavesdropped by an
attacker at the time interval j, thus w ∈ D(φ j) thanks to time-dependent stability. Then
Topφ j
A/P
a2!w⊲m2
=========⇒ Topφ j
A/P
. Since a2 ∈ ν′′2 we have m2[Q2]ν
′′
2
a2?w
−−−−−−→ m2[ ˆQ2]ν′′2 . Finally
m1[Q1]ν′′1 a2?w−−−−−−→ m1[Q1]ν′′1 by rule (RcvEnb). Thus by applying rule (Bcast) we obtain
m1[Q1]ν′′1 | m2[Q2]ν′′2 | Topφ jA/P
a2!w⊲∅
========⇒ m1[Q1]ν′′1 | m2[ ˆQ2]ν′′2 | Topφ jA/P
and by rule (Shh) m1[Q1]ν′′1 | m2[Q2]ν′′2 | Topφ jA/P
τ
===⇒ m1[Q1]ν′′1 | m2[ ˆQ2]ν′′2 | Topφ jA/P.
Now m1[Q1]ν′′1
m1!w⊲ν′′1
−−−−−−−−−−→ m1[ ˆQ1]ν′′1 and by rule (RcvEnb) we have both m2[ ˆQ2]ν′′2 m1?w−−−−−−→
m2[ ˆQ2]ν′′2 and Topφ jA/P
m1?w
−−−−−−→ Topφ j
A/P
. Thus
m1[Q1]ν′′1 | m2[ ˆQ2]ν′′2 | Topφ jA/P
m1!w⊲obs
−−−−−−−−−−→ m1[ ˆQ1]ν′′1 | m2[ ˆQ2]ν′′2 | Topφ jA/P.
α = τ. The most significant case is an application of rule (Shh), from the premise m1[Q1]ν′1 |
m2[Q2]ν′2 | N m1!w⊲∅−−−−−−−−−→ m1[ ˆQ1]ν′1 | m2[ ˆQ2]ν′2 | ˆN. Since obs ∈ ν′1 ∩ ν′2, the broadcast
action must be performed by N; thus there exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that N ai!w⊲mi−−−−−−−−−→ ˆN
and ml[Ql]ν′l ai?w−−−−−−→ ml[ ˆQl]ν′l , for l = 1, 2. Now also Topφ jA/P
ai!w⊲mi
=========⇒ Topφ j
A/P
and
ml[Ql]ν′′l ai?w−−−−−−→ ml[ ˆQl]ν′′l , for l = 1, 2. Thus m1[Q1]ν′′1 | m2[Q2]ν′′2 | Topφ jA/P
τ
−−−→
m1[ ˆQ1]ν′′1 | m2[ ˆQ2]ν′′2 | Topφ jA/P . 
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Lemma A.2 If M is time-dependent stable with respect to a sequence of knowledge {φ j} j≥0,
A is a set of attacking nodes for M and O ⊆ nds (M) then
MA
O
∣∣∣ A . MA
O
∣∣∣ Topφ0
A/nds(M) for every A ∈ Aφ0A/nds(M) .
Proof We prove the lemma in the most general case, that is O = nds (M). Then we fix an
arbitrary A ∈ Aφ0
A/nds(M) and we define the proper simulation as follows:
R
def
=
⋃
j≥0
{ (
M′ | A′, M′ | Topφ j
A/nds(M)
)
s.t. MA | A Λ===⇒ M′ | A′ with
nds (M′) = nds
(
MA
)
and #σ(Λ) = j }
We let (M′ | A′, M′ | Topφ j
A/nds(M)
)
∈ R. We make a case analysis on why M′ | A′ α−−−→ N.
α = m?w. As for Lemma 3.11, this case is straightforward.
α = σ. Then N = M′′ | A′′ with M′ σ−−−→ M′′ and A′ σ−−−→ A′′. Now also Topφ j
A/nds(M)
σ
−−−→
Topφ j+1
A/nds(M) by rule (σ-Sum), hence by rule (σ-Par) we have M′ | Top
φ j
A/nds(M)
σ
−−−→ M′′ |
Topφ j+1
A/nds(M).
α = !w⊲ν. Since the environment of the system contains just the node obs, the transition has to
be derived by the rule (Obs) whose premise is M′ | A′ m!w⊲obs−−−−−−−−−→ N. Since obs < Env (A′)
then m ∈ nds (M′) and N = M′′ | A′′ with M′ m!w⊲ν
′
−−−−−−−−→ M′′, {obs} = ν′ \ nds (A′)
and A′ m?w−−−−−→ A′′. Now we have Topφ j
A/nds(M)
m?w
−−−−−→ Topφ j
A/nds(M) by rule (RcvEnb).
Hence M′ | Topφ j
A/nds(M)
m!w⊲obs
−−−−−−−−−→ M′′ | Topφ j
A/nds(M) by rule (Bcast) and the fact that
nds (A′) = A = nds
(
Topφ j
A/nds(M)
)
. Finally, by rule (Obs): M′ | Topφ j
A/nds(M)
!w⊲obs
−−−−−−−−→
M′′ | Topφ j
A/nds(M).
α = τ. The most significant case is when τ is derived by an application of rule (Shh), then we
have M′ | A′ a!w⊲∅−−−−−−−→ N and a ∈ nds (A′) = A since the broadcast from any of the
nodes in nds (M′) = nds
(
MA
)
can be observed by the node obs. In this case we have
M′ a?w−−−−−→ M′′ and A′ a!w⊲m−−−−−−−−→ A′′ where m is the single node of M attacked by a. Now
also Topφ j
A/nds(M)
τ
−−−→
a!w⊲m
−−−−−−−−→ Topφ j
A/nds(M) by rules (Tau) and (Snd) since the attacking
node associated to m does not change and msg(A′) ⊆ D(φ j). Hence, by rule (Bcast): M′ |
Topφ j
A/nds(M)
a!w⊲∅
=======⇒ M′′ | Topφ j
A/nds(M). Thus M
′ | Topφ j
A/nds(M)
τ
===⇒ M′′ | Topφ j
A/nds(M)
by rule (Shh). 
Proof of Theorem 3.12 By Lemma A.2 we have MA
O
| A . MAO | Topφ0
A/nds(M) for every
A ∈ Aφ0
A/nds(M). Then by transitivity of . we have M
AO | A . N for every A ∈ Aφ0
A/nds(M) and
we conclude that M is tGNDCN
φ0,O
. 
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Proofof Proposition 4.1 By induction on i we show that whenever bs[ ˆD1]νbs Λ===⇒ bs[ ˆDi]obs or
m[ ˆA1]obs Λ===⇒ m[ ˆAi]obs then #σ(Λ) = 2(i − 1). Moreover, we observe that !pi⊲obs can be per-
formed exclusively because m[ ˆAi]obs
!pi⊲obs
−−−−−−−−→. While !endi⊲obs can be performed exclusively
because bs[ ˆDi]obs Ω===⇒ !endi⊲obs−−−−−−−−−−→ with #σΩ = 2. Hence we deduce that:
1. if m[ ˆA1]obs Λ===⇒
!pi⊲obs
−−−−−−−−→ then #σ(Λ) = 2(i − 1).
2. if bs[ ˆD1]obs Λ===⇒
!endi⊲obs
−−−−−−−−−−→ then #σ(Λ) = 2i.
Now, the result is a straightforward consequence of these two properties. 
Proofof Theorem 4.2 The system (µTESLA′boot)A | A performs the following computation:
bs[D′1]νbs | m[A1]νm | A
!p1⊲obs
−−−−−−−−−→
bs[D′1]νbs | m[σ.B1]νm | a[σ.!〈p1〉.nil]νa | b[Y]νb
σ
−−−→
bs[σ.D′2]νbs | m[B1]νm | a[!〈p1〉.nil]νa | b[⌊?(y).σ.!〈y〉.nil⌋nil]νb
τ
−−−→
bs[σ.D′2]νbs | m[B1]νm | a[nil]νa | b[σ.!〈p1〉.nil]νb
σ
−−−→
bs[D′2]νbs | m[A2]νm | a[nil]νa | b[!〈p1〉.nil]νb
τ
−−−→
bs[E′2{p1/p}]νbs | m[A2]νm | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb
!p2⊲obs
−−−−−−−−−→
bs[E′2{p1/p}]νbs | m[σ.B2]νm | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb
σ
−−−→
bs[!〈wi〉.G′2{p1/p}]νbs | m[B2]νm | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb
!w1⊲obs
−−−−−−−−−→
bs[E42
′
{n1/n}]νbs | m[C2{w1/w}]νm | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb σ−−−→
bs[!〈end1〉.D′3]νbs | m[A3]νm | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb
!end1⊲obs
−−−−−−−−−−−→ .
Hence agreement is not reached. 
Proofof Lemma 4.4 We provide the proper simulation in both cases.
Case 1: Base Station. To show that bs[D1]b | Topφ0b/bs . bs[Tick]∅ we define the relation
R
def
=
{ (
M, bs[Tick]∅
)
such that bs[D1]{b} | Topφ0b/bs
Λ
===⇒ M
}
.
We first notice that for every
(
M, bs[Tick]∅ ) ∈ R we have Env (M) = ∅ . Thus the most
significant actions can only be M τ−−−→ or M σ−−−→ or input actions that can be derived without
applying rule (Rcv). Then it is straightforward to prove that R is a simulation.
Case 2: Node. To show that m[A′′1 ]{a,obs} | Top
φ0
a/m
. m[ ¯A1]obs we pick an index i ≥ 1,
the messages w¯,w′,w′′ and we build a relation Ri(w′, w¯,w′′) containing the pair (m[A′′i ]{a,obs} |
Topφ2(i−1)
a/m
, m[ ¯Ai]obs
)
along with its derivatives which may be generated when m receives w¯ from
the attacker. To improve readability: (i) we abbreviate the process R〈i + 1, i−1,⊥, ki−1〉 simply
as Ri, (ii) we employ the structural congruence ≡ to rewrite ¯Ai as:
¯Ai
def
= !〈pi〉.σ. ¯Bi ¯Bi
def
= ⌊τ. ¯Ci⌋ ¯Ai+1 ¯Ci
def
= σ.!〈authi〉.Ri .
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Then we define Ri(w′, w¯,w′′) to be the following binary relation:{ (
m[A′′i ]{a,obs} | Top
φ2(i−1)
a/m
, m[ ¯Ai]obs
)
,
(
m[A′′i ]{a,obs} | a[!〈w′〉.Tφ2(i−1)]m, m[ ¯Ai]obs
)
,(
m[σ.B′′i ]{a,obs} | Top
φ2(i−1)
a/m
, m[σ. ¯Bi]obs
)
,
(
m[σ.B′′i ]{a,obs} | a[!〈w′〉.Tφ2(i−1)]m, m[σ. ¯Bi]obs
)
,(
m[B′′i ]{a,obs} | Top
φ2i−1
a/m
, m[ ¯Bi]obs
)
,
(
m[B′′i ]{a,obs} | a[!〈w¯〉.Tφ2i−1]m, m[ ¯Bi]obs
)
,(
m[{w¯/w}C′′i ]{a,obs} | Top
φ2i−1
a/m
, m[ ¯Bi]obs
)
,
(
m[{w¯/w}C′′i ]{a,obs} | a[!〈w¯〉.Tφ2i−1]m, m[ ¯Bi]obs
)
,(
m[!〈authi〉.Ri]{a,obs} | Topφ2ia/m, m[!〈authi〉.Ri]obs
)
,(
m[!〈authi〉.Ri]{a,obs} | a[!〈w′′〉.Tφ2i]m, m[!〈authi〉.Ri]obs
)
,(
m[Ri]{a,obs} | Topφ2ia/m, m[Ri]obs
)
,
(
m[Ri]{a,obs} | a[!〈w′′〉.Tφ2i]m!〈w′′〉., m[Ri]obs
) }
.
Now we notice that both the process Ri and its derivatives cannot perform any broadcast ac-
tion. Moreover, the network m[Ri]{a,obs} | Topφ2ia/m, along with its derivatives, can performjust τ-actions, σ-actions or input actions derived without applying rule (Rcv). Then it is
straightforward to prove that there exists a simulation Ri containing the pair
(
m[Ri]{a,obs} |
Topφ2i
a/m
, m[Ri]obs
)
.
We show that the required simulation is given by the following relation
R
def
=
⋃
i≥1
(
Ri ∪
⋃
w′ ∈ D(φ2(i−1))
w¯ ∈ D(φ2i−1)
w′′ ∈ D(φ2i)
Ri(w′, w¯,w′′)
)
.
We outline the most significant cases. We omit input actions since the environment contains
exclusively the node obs which cannot transmit, thus all input actions can be derived just by
combining rules (RcvEnb) and (RcvPar). We also omit internal choices of the attacker.
In the pair (m[A′′i ]{a,obs} | Topφ2(i−1)a/m , m[ ¯Ai]obs ) we have a single significant action:
• m[A′′i ]{a,obs} | Top
φ2(i−1)
a/m
!pi⊲obs
−−−−−−−−→ m[σ.B′′i ]{a,obs} | Top
φ2(i−1)
a/m
. Then the second network
replies with m[ ¯Ai]obs
!pi⊲obs
−−−−−−−−→ m[σ. ¯Bi]obs.
In the pair (m[σ.B′′i ]{a,obs} | Topφ2(i−1)a/m , m[σ. ¯Bi]obs ) we have a single significant action:
• m[σ.B′′i ]{a,obs} | Top
φ2(i−1)
a/m
σ
−−−→ m[B′′i ]{a,obs} | Top
φ2i−1
a/m
. Then m[σ. ¯Bi]obs σ−−−→ m[ ¯Bi]obs.
In the pair (m[B′′i ]{a,obs} | Topφ2i−1a/m , m[σ. ¯Bi]obs ) we have a significant action:
• m[B′′i ]{a,obs} | Top
φ2i−1
a/m
σ
−−−→ m[A′′i+1]{a,obs} | Top
φ2i
a/m
where m does not receive anything
thus performs a timeout. Then m[ ¯Bi]obs σ−−−→ m[ ¯Ai+1]obs.
In the pair (m[B′′i ]{a,obs} | a[!〈w¯〉.Tφ2i−1]m , m[σ. ¯Bi]obs ) we have two significant actions:
• m[B′′i ]{a,obs} | a[!〈w¯〉.Tφ2i−1]m
τ
−−−→ m[{w¯/w}C′′i ]{a,obs} | Top
φ2i−1
a/m
where m receives w¯. Then
m[ ¯Bi]obs ==⇒ m[σ. ¯Bi]obs .
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• m[B′′i ]{a,obs} | a[!〈w¯〉.Tφ2i−1]m
τ
−−−→ m[B′′i ]{a,obs} | Top
φ2i−1
a/m
where w¯ gets lost. Then the
second network m[σ. ¯Bi]obs ==⇒ m[σ. ¯Bi]obs.
In the pair
(
m[{w¯/w}C′′i ]{a,obs} | Top
φ2i−1
a/m
, m[ ¯Bi]obs
)
we have two significant transitions
• m[{w¯/w}C′′i ]{a,obs} | Top
φ2i−1
a/m
σ
−−−→ m[!〈authi〉.Ri]{a,obs} | Topφ2ia/m where m verifies the MAC
of the message w¯, checks that the nonce included in w¯ is actually ni and then it authen-
ticates the key ki−1. Then m[ ¯Bi]obs σ===⇒ m[!〈authi〉.Ri]obs.
• m[{w¯/w}C′′i ]{a,obs} | Top
φ2i−1
a/m
σ
−−−→ m[A′′i+1]{a,obs} | Top
φ2i
a/m
where m does not verify the MAC
of the message w¯, thus it cannot check that the nonce included in w¯ is actually ni, or in
general it finds out that the message is corrupted. Then m[ ¯Bi]obs σ===⇒ m[ ¯Ai+1]obs. 
Proofof Proposition 4.6 Similar to that of Proposition 4.1. 
Proofof Lemma 4.7 We provide the proper simulation in both the cases.
Case 1: Base Station. We notice that the process S i, along with its derivatives, cannot receive
any message. Thus an attacker in b cannot affect the behaviour of bs[S 1]{b,obs}. Hence it is
straightforward to prove that bs[S 1]{b,obs} | Topφ0b/bs . bs[S 1]obs.
Case 2: Nodes. We fix a node m ∈ {m1, . . . ,mh}, we let a ∈ {a1, . . . , ah} denote its correspond-
ing attacking place and we show that
m[R′〈1,−1,⊥, ¯k〉]{a,obs} | Topφ0
a/m
. m[ ˆR1]obs .
To uniform the notation, we define k−1
def
= ¯k. We pick the indexes i ≥ 1 and −1 ≥ l ≥ i − 2, and
the messages rˆ, pˆ, ˆk and qˆ. Then we build the relation Rl,rˆi (pˆ, ˆk, qˆ) which contains the pair(
m[R′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]{a,obs} | Topφ2(i−1)a/m , m[ ˆRi]obs
)
along with its derivatives which may be generated when m first receives pˆ and then ˆk from the
attacker. To improve the readability: (i) we define ν′m def= {a, obs}, (ii) we employ the structural
congruence ≡ to rewrite the process ˆRi as:
ˆRi
def
= σ. ˆPi ˆPi
def
= ⌊τ.σ. ˆZi+1⌋ ˆRi+1 ˆZi
def
= !〈authi−2〉. ˆRi .
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Then we define
R
l,rˆ
i (pˆ, ˆk, qˆ)
def
=
{ (
m[R′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2(i−1)a/m , m[ ˆRi]obs
)
,(
m[R′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | a[!〈 pˆ〉.Tφ2(i−1)]m, m[ ˆRi]obs
)
,(
m[σ.P′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2(i−1)a/m , m[ ˆRi]obs
)
,(
m[σ.P′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | a[!〈 pˆ〉.Tφ2(i−1)]m, m[ ˆRi]obs
)
,(
m[P′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , m[ ˆPi]obs
)
,(
m[P′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | a[!〈ˆk〉.Tφ2i−1]m, m[ ˆPi]obs
)
,(
m[T ′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl, ˆk〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , m[ ˆPi]obs
)
,(
m[T ′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl, ˆk〉]ν′m | a[!〈ˆk〉.Tφ2i−1]m, m[ ˆPi]obs
)
,(
m[Q′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , m[ ˆPi]obs
) }
,(
m[Q′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | a[!〈ˆk〉.Tφ2i−1]m, m[ ˆPi]obs
) }
,(
m[Z′〈i+1, i−1, pˆ, rˆ, ki−1〉]ν′m | Topφ2ia/m, m[ ˆZi+1]obs
)
,(
m[Z′〈i+1, i−1, pˆ, rˆ, ki−1〉]ν′m | a[!〈qˆ〉.Tφ2i]m, m[ ˆZi+1]obs
) }
.
and we show that the required simulation is given by the following relation
R
def
=
⋃
i≥1
⋃
−1 ≤ l ≤ i−2
rˆ ∈ D(φ2(i−2))
⋃
pˆ ∈ D(φ2(i−1))
ˆk ∈ D(φ2i−1)
qˆ ∈ D(φ2i)
R
l,rˆ
i
(
pˆ, ˆk, qˆ)
As done for Lemma 4.4, we outline the most significant cases. Again, we omit input actions
and internal choices of the attacker.
In the pair
(
m[R′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2(i−1)a/m , m[ ˆRi]obs
)
we have a significant action:
• m[R′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2(i−1)a/m
σ
−−−→ m[Q′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , where m does not receive
anything. Then m[ ˆRi]obs σ===⇒ m[ ˆPi]obs.
In the pair (m[R′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | a[!〈 pˆ〉.Tφ2(i−1)]m, m[ ˆRi]obs ) we have two significant actions:
• m[R′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | a[!〈 pˆ〉.Tφ2(i−1)]m
τ
−−−→ m[σ.P′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2(i−1)a/m , where m re-
ceives pˆ from the attacker. Then m[ ˆRi]obs ==⇒ m[ ˆRi]obs.
• m[R′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | a[!〈 pˆ〉.Tφ2(i−1)]m
τ
−−−→ m[R′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2(i−1)a/m , where pˆ gets lost.
Then m[ ˆRi]obs ==⇒ m[ ˆRi]obs.
In the pair
(
m[σ.P′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2(i−1)a/m , m[ ˆRi]obs
)
we have just a significant action:
• m[σ.P′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2(i−1)a/m
σ
−−−→ m[P′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m . Then the second
network replies with m[ ˆRi]obs σ===⇒ m[ ˆPi]obs.
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In the pair
(
m[P′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , m[ ˆPi]obs
)
we have just a significant action:
• m[P′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m
σ
−−−→ m[R′〈i+1, l, pˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2ia/m, where m does not
receive anything. Then m[ ˆPi]obs σ===⇒ m[ ˆRi+1]obs.
In the pair (m[P′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | a[!〈ˆk〉.Tφ2i−1]m, m[ ˆPi]obs ) we have two significant actions:
• m[P′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | a[!〈ˆk〉.Tφ2i−1]m
τ
−−−→ m[T ′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl, ˆk〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , where m re-
ceives ˆk. Then the second network replies with m[ ˆPi]obs ==⇒ m[ ˆPi]obs.
• m[P′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | a[!〈ˆk〉.Tφ2i−1]m
τ
−−−→ m[P′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , where ˆk gets
lost. The second network replies with m[ ˆPi]obs ==⇒ m[ ˆPi]obs.
In the pair (m[T ′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl, ˆk〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , m[ ˆPi]obs ) we have three significant actions:
• m[T ′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl, ˆk〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m
σ
−−−→ m[Z′〈i+1, i−1, pˆ, rˆ, ki−1〉]ν′m | Topφ2ia/m where m
checks that kl = Fi−1−l(ˆh) and authenticates rˆ = pi−1. Then m[ ˆPi]obs σ===⇒ m[ ˆZi+1]obs.
• m[T ′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl, ˆk〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m
σ
−−−→ m[R′〈i+1, i−1, pˆ, ki−1〉]ν′m | Topφ2ia/m where m checks
that kl = Fi−l(ˆh) without but it does not authenticate rˆ. Then m[ ˆPi]obs σ===⇒ m[ ˆRi+1]obs.
• m[T ′〈i, l, pˆ, rˆ, kl, ˆk〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m
σ
−−−→ m[R′〈i+1, l, pˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2ia/m where m verifies
kl , Fi−l(ˆh). Then again m[ ˆPi]obs σ===⇒ m[ ˆRi+1]obs by timeout.
In the pair (m[Q′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , m[ ˆPi]obs ) we have a significant action
• m[Q′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m
σ
−−−→ m[R〈i+1, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2ia/m, where m does not receive
anything and thus performs a timeout. Then m[ ˆPi]obs σ===⇒ m[ ˆRi+1]obs.
In the pair (m[Q′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | a[!〈ˆk〉.Tφ2i−1]m, m[ ˆPi]obs ) the first network can perform two
significant actions
• m[Q′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | a[!〈ˆk〉.Tφ2i−1]m
τ
−−−→ m[T 〈i, l, rˆ, rˆ, kl, ˆk〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , where m receives
ˆk. Then the second network replies m[ ˆPi]obs ==⇒ m[ ˆPi]obs.
• m[Q′〈i, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | a[!〈ˆk〉.Tφ2i−1]m
τ
−−−→ m[R〈i+1, l, rˆ, kl〉]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , where ˆk gets lost.
Then the second network replies m[ ˆPi]obs ==⇒ m[ ˆPi]obs. 
Proofof Proposition 5.1 Similar to that of Proposition 4.1. 
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Proofof Theorem 5.2 The system (LEAP′+)A | A admits the following computation:
m[S 1]νm | r[R′]νr | A !hello1⊲obs−−−−−−−−−−−−→
m[σ.P]νm | r[R′]νr | a[σ.!〈hello1〉.nil]νa | b[Y]νb σ−−−→
m[P]νm | r[σ.R′]νr | a[!〈hello1〉.nil]νa | b[⌊?(y).σ.!〈y〉.nil]νb τ−−−→
m[{hello1/q}P1]νm | r[σ.R′]νr | a[nil]νa | b[σ.!〈hello1〉.nil]νb σ−−−→
m[S 2]νm | r[R′]νr | a[nil]νa | b[!〈hello1〉.nil]νb τ−−−→
m[S 2]νm | r[σ.!〈q1〉.R8′]νr | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb !hello2⊲obs−−−−−−−−−−−−→
m[σ.P]νm | r[σ.!〈q1〉.R8′]νr | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb σ−−−→
m[P]νm | r[!〈q1〉.R8′]νr | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb
!q1⊲obs
−−−−−−−−−→
m[{q1/q}P1]νm | r[R8′]νr | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb σ−−−→
m[S 3]νm | r[!〈end1〉.nil]νr | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb !end1⊲obs−−−−−−−−−−−→
Then agreement is not reached. 
Proofof Lemma 5.4 We prove this lemma by showing the appropriate simulations.
Case 1: Sender. We define ν′m = {a, obs}. We need to prove m[S 1]ν
′
m | Topφ0
a/m
. m[ ˆS 1]obs.
Thus we fix an index i = 1, 2, . . ., we pick the messages q′ ∈ D(φ2(i−1)) and qˆ ∈ D(φ2i−1),
and we build the relation Ri
(
q′, qˆ
)
containing (m[S ′′i ]ν′m | Topφ2(i−1)a/m , m[ ˆS i]obs ) along with its
derivatives which may be generated when m receives qˆ from the attacker.
Ri
(
q′, qˆ
) def
=
{ (
m[S ′′i ]ν
′
m | Topφ2(i−1)
a/m
, m[ ˆS i]obs
)
,(
m[S ′′i ]ν
′
m | a[!〈q′〉.Tφ2(i−1)]m, m[ ˆS i]obs
)
,(
m[σ.P′′]ν′m | Topφ2(i−1)
a/m
, m[σ.⌊τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil⌋ ˆS i+1]obs ) ,(
m[σ.P′′]ν′m | a[!〈q′〉.Tφ2(i−1)]m, m[σ.
⌊
τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil
⌋
ˆS i+1]obs
)
,(
m[P′′]ν′m | Topφ2i−1
a/m
, m[⌊τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil⌋ ˆS i+1]obs ) ,(
m[P′′]ν′m | a[!〈qˆ〉.Tφ2i−1]m, m[
⌊
τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil
⌋
ˆS i+1]obs
)
,(
m[{qˆ/q}P1′′]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , m[
⌊
τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil
⌋
ˆS i+1]obs
)
,(
m[{qˆ/q}P1′′]ν′m | a[!〈qˆ〉.Tφ2i−1]m, m[
⌊
τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil
⌋
ˆS i+1]obs
)
,(
m[!〈authi〉.nil]ν′m | Topφ2ia/m, m[!〈authi〉.nil]obs
) }
.
Moreover, it is straightforward to prove that there exists a simulation Ri containing the pair(
m[!〈authi〉.nil]ν′m | Topφ2ia/m, m[!〈authi〉.nil]obs
)
.
Then we show that the required simulation is given by the following relation
Ri
def
=
⋃
i≥1
(
Ri ∪
⋃
q′ ∈ D(φ2(i−1))
qˆ ∈ D(φ2i−1)
Ri(q′, qˆ)
)
.
As done for Lemma 4.4, we outline the most significant cases. Again, we omit input actions
and internal choices of the attacker.
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In the pair
(
m[S ′′i ]ν
′
m | Topφ2(i−1)
a/m
, m[ ˆS i]obs
)
we have a significant action:
• m[S ′′i ]ν
′
m | Topφ2(i−1)
a/m
!helloi⊲obs
−−−−−−−−−−−→ m[σ.P′′]ν′m | Topφ2(i−1)
a/m
, where m broadcasts the packet
helloi. Then m[ ˆS i]obs !helloi⊲obs===========⇒ m[σ.
⌊
τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil
⌋
ˆS i+1]obs.
In the pair (m[σ.P′′]ν′m | Topφ2(i−1)
a/m
,m[σ.⌊τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil⌋ ˆS i+1]obs ) we have a significant action:
• m[σ.P′′]ν′m | Topφ2(i−1)
a/m
σ
−−−→ m[P′′]ν′m | Topφ2i−1
a/m
. Then m[σ.⌊τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil⌋ ˆS i+1]obs σ===⇒
m[⌊τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil⌋ ˆS i+1]obs.
In the pair (m[P′′]ν′m | Topφ2i−1
a/m
, m[⌊τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil⌋ ˆS i+1]obs ) we have a significant action:
• m[P′′]ν′m | Topφ2i−1
a/m
σ
−−−→ m[S ′′i+1]ν
′
m | Topφ2i
a/m
, where m does not receive anything and
performs a timeout. Then m[⌊τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil⌋ ˆS i+1]obs σ===⇒ m[ ˆS i+1]obs.
In the pair (m[P′′]ν′m | a[!〈qˆ〉.Tφ2i−1]m, m[⌊τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil⌋ ˆS i+1]obs ) we consider two actions:
• m[P′′]ν′m | a[!〈qˆ〉.Tφ2i−1]m
τ
−−−→ m[{qˆ/q}P1′′]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , where m receives qˆ. Then the
second network replies m[⌊τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil⌋ ˆS i+1]obs ==⇒ m[⌊τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil⌋ ˆS i+1]obs.
• m[P′′]ν′m | a[!〈qˆ〉.Tφ2i−1]m
τ
−−−→ m[P′′]ν′m | Topφ2i−1
a/m
, where qˆ gets lost. Then the second
network replies m[⌊τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil⌋ ˆS i+1]obs ==⇒ m[⌊τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil⌋ ˆS i+1]obs.
In
(
m[{qˆ/q}P1′′]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , m[
⌊
τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil
⌋
ˆS i+1]obs
)
we have two significant actions:
• m[{qˆ/q}P1′′]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m
σ
−−−→ m[!〈authi〉.nil]ν′m | Topφ2ia/m, where m verifies that qˆ refers to
the nonce ni. Then m[
⌊
τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil
⌋
ˆS i+1]obs σ===⇒ m[!〈authi〉.nil]obs.
• m[{qˆ/q}P1′′]ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m
σ
−−−→ m[S ′′i+1]ν
′
m | Topφ2i
a/m
, where m verifies that qˆ does not refer to
ni, or it finds out that qˆ is corrupted. Then m[
⌊
τ.σ.!〈authi〉.nil
⌋
ˆS i+1]obs σ===⇒ m[ ˆS i+1]obs.
Case 2: Receiver. Similar to Case 1 of Lemma 4.4 
Proofof Proposition 6.1 Similar to that of Proposition 4.1. 
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Proofof Theorem 6.2 The system (LiSP′)A | A admits the following computation:
m[Z]νm | kl[L0]νkl | A !r⊲obs−−−−−−−→
m[σ.W]νm | kl[σ.{r/r}I1]νkl | A σ−−−→
m[W]νm | kl[{r/r}I1]νkl | a[σ.⌊?(x).σ.!〈x〉.nil⌋nil]νa | b[⌊?(y).σ.!〈y〉.nil⌋nil]νb
!q1⊲obs
−−−−−−−−−→
m[W]νm | kl[σ.L1]νkl | a[σ.⌊?(x).σ.!〈x〉.nil⌋nil]νa | b[σ.!〈q1〉.nil]νb σ−−−→
m[Z]νm | kl[L1]νkl | a[⌊?(x).σ.!〈x〉.nil⌋nil]νa | b[!〈q1〉.nil]νb τ−−−→
m[Z]νm | kl[σ.{q1/r}I2]νkl | a[σ.!〈q1〉.nil]νa | b[nil]νb !r⊲obs−−−−−−−→
m[σ.W]νm | kl[σ.{q1/r}I2]νkl | a[σ.!〈q1〉.nil]νa | b[nil]νb σ−−−→
m[W]νm | kl[{q1/r}I2]νkl | a[!〈q1〉.nil]νa | b[nil]νb τ−−−→
m[σ.{q1/q}T 5]νm | kl[{q1/r}I2]νkl | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb σ−−−→
m[!〈auth1〉.σ.R(k2, ks+1, s − 1)]νm | kl[L2]νkl | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb !auth1⊲obs−−−−−−−−−−−→
Then m signals the correct reconfiguration based on an old packet. 
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